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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(J) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW
The following issues are present in this appeal:
1. Whether the trial court correctly interpreted § 73-4-11 of the Utah Code. "A trial
court's determination of the law is reviewed under a correctness standard; [the reviewing
court] afford[s] no degree of deference to a trial judge's determination of the law." United
States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-ClevelandIrr. Co,, 2003 UT 49, f 9, 79 P.3d 945; Jeffs v.
Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998).
2. Whether the trial court developed an appropriate equitable remedy in its decision
regarding the State Engineer's motion to dismiss. On appeal, '"a trial court is accorded
considerable latitude and discretion in applying and formulating an equitable remedy,' and
will not be overturned unless it abused its discretion." Id, (quoting Thurston v. Box Elder
County, 892 P.2d 1034,1041 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (citing LHIW, Inc. v. DeLorean, 753 P.2d
961, 963 (Utah 1988); Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981))).
3. Whether the district court properly allowed the Green River Canal Company
("Canal Company") to amend its objection to the State Engineer's proposed determination
in the general adjudication pursuant to § 73-4-10 of the Utah Code. According to this court,
"[t]he granting or denial of leave to amend a pleading is within the broad discretion of the
trial court, and [this court] will not disturb such a ruling absent a showing of an abuse of that
4848-3515-2128/GR255 005
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discretion." Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, ^ 31, 84 P.3d 1154;
accord R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., 936 P.2d 1068, 1080 (Utah 1997).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The plain language of three Utah statutes is determinative. Section 73-4-3 of the Utah
Code states in part as follows:
as soon as [the survey of the water source] has been completed,
the state engineer shall file notice of completion with the clerk
and give notice by registered mail or by personal service to all
claimants whose names appear on the list that the survey has
been completed and that their claims are due within 90 days
from the date of notice.
Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-3 (1989) (attached as Addendum A). Section 73-4-10 of the Utah
Code states as follows:
The court shall have power to allow amendments to any petition,
statement or pleading; to extend as provided in this title the time
for filing any statement of pleading, statement, report or protest.
Id. at § 73-4-10 (attached as Addendum B). Section 73-4-11 of the Utah Code states in part
as follows:
After full consideration of the statements of claims, and of the
surveys, records, andfiles, and after a personal examination of
the river system or water source involved, if such examination
is deemed necessary, the state engineer shallformulate a report
and a proposed determination of all rights to the use of the
water of such river system or water source, and a copy of the
same shall be mailed by regular mail to each claimant with
notice that any claimant dissatisfied therewith may within ninety
days from such date of mailing file with the clerk of the district
court a written objection thereto duly verified on oath.
Id. at § 73-4-11 (attached as Addendum C).
4848-3515-2128/GR255 005
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter arises out of the general adjudication initiated on March 15, 1956, to
determine the various rights to the use of water in the Lower Green River and the Price River
Drainage areas. (R. 1 :i, R. 161.) On May 1,1972, the State Engineer completed a Proposed
Determination of Water Rights in the Price River and Lower Green River Drainage (Area
Code Nos. 91 and 92) ("Proposed Determination") containing his recommendations
regarding all the claims to water, including the Canal Company, in the named drainage areas.
(R. 1 :iii.) Shortly after receiving the Proposed Determination, the Canal Company submitted
an obj ection to the State Engineer's recommendation concerning the Canal Company's Water
User's Claim. (R. 37.) The Canal Company filed amendments to its initial objection in 1993
and 1999. (R. 6, 39, 42.) This interlocutory appeal arises out of the district court's denial
of the State Engineer's motion to dismiss the Canal Company's objection.

]

In a recent decision, Green River Canal Company v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, 84 P.3d
1134 (hereinafter Green River), this Court reviewed a district court's decision regarding a
contract matter between the Canal Company and Lee Thayn. Although the issues and
adverse parties were distinct from this case, this Court commented on facts at issue in this
case. In Green River, this Court noted that the Canal Company "has never filed an objection
to the proposed determination," that the Canal Company "has long acquiesced in the State
Engineer's proposed determination," and that the Canal Company "has recently asked the
State Engineer to modify the proposed determination, [but] . . . was denied." Id. at ^j 31.
These statements reflect on the central issues of this appeal but conflict directly with the
undisputed facts and the district court's February 7,2003 Memorandum Decision holding the
Canal Company's objections timely, from which this appeal was taken. However, these
statements in Green River should not be considered to have resolved the questions presented
in this case because they were never a part of that litigation. Instead, these statements
illustrate this Court's recognition that "the prosecution of an independent action" outside of
the general adjudication can result in judgments inconsistent with decisions in the general
adjudication. United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irr. Co., 2003 UT 49, % 12,
79P.3d945.
4848-3515-2128/GR255.005
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THE CANAL COMPANY'S WATER USER CLAIM AND OBJECTION
In 1880, the settlers of Green River City began constructing diversion facilities on the
Green River. The Canal Company was formally incorporated in 1904 to serve those same
farms and numerous residents within Green River City. (R. 60.) The Canal Company filed
a Statement of Water Users Claim to Diligence Rights on June 18, 1952, stating it was
diverting 20 cubic feet per second (cfs) of water on a year-round basis for stockwatering
(directly out of the canal and by a few outlets that could access water at that level), plus an
additional 60 cfs during the irrigation season for a total diversion of 80 cfs, thereby
memorializing the diversion and use of water it had historically made since 1880. See
Statement of Water User's Claim to Diligence Rights, 1 (attached as Addendum D). Until
1997, the Water Code specified that diligence claims such as the one filed by the Canal
Company constituted "prima facie evidence of claimed right or rights therein described."
Utah Code Ann. § 73-5-13(1989) (attached as Addendum E). Their pre-1903 use under this
diligence claim legally entitled the Canal Company to 80 cfs during the irrigation season.2
The terrain crossed by the Canal Company's canal is virtually flat, which reduces the
flow rate, allows silt in the water to settle out, and is the cause of the Canal Company's need
for 80 cfs. (R. 61.) The Green River is extremely silt laden, and silt continuously builds up
on the bottom of the canal. (R. 156.) The Canal Company has maintained and operated the
canal for over 100 years by constant "sluicing," i.e., regularly opening sluice gates along the

2

The phrase "diligence claim" comes from the fact that, prior to 1903, there was no
application process in Utah, and water rights were acquired by diversion and beneficial use.
4848-3515-2128/GR255 005
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canal to flush out the silt buildup one section at a time. (R. 61.) Before the district court, the
Canal Company presented an undisputed affidavit by Jack A. Barnett, P. E., indicating that
the canal must be flowing at full capacity, i.e. 80 cfs, in order to function properly. See
Barnet Affidavit, f 4 (R. 156; attached as Addendum F.) The Barnett Affidavit specifies that
without sluicing, the silt settles in the canal and slows down the flow of water. See id. at \
5. (R. 156.) All non-consumed water flows back into the Green River.3 (R. 60.)
In its Statement of Water User's Claim, submitted in the general adjudication on
November 6, 1969, the Canal Company indicated that it had a right to the beneficial use of
surface water of the Green River. (R. 81, attached as Addendum G.) The Canal Company's
statement described the nature of the water right as 60 cfs (cubic feet per second) used for
irrigation purposes from March 15 to November 1 and 20 cfs used for stockwatering
purposes from January 1 to December 31. {Id.) Additionally, the Canal Company's Water
User's Claim indicated that these amounts included water used for domestic purposes from
January 1 to December 31. {Id.)
After receiving and compiling water user claims from claimants along the Price and
Green rivers, the State Engineer produced his Proposed Determination on May 1, 1972, and
began distributing it. (R. 1 :iii.) The Proposed Determination noted in its introduction that
"the diversion requirements have been considered to be 4.00 acre feet per acre per calendar

3

This Court has twice held that using water to transport other water for irrigation
purposes is a beneficial use so long as the carrier water is returned th the natural stream. See
East Bench Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co., 2 Utah 2d 170, 271 P.2d 449, 455 (1954); Jackson
v. Spanish Fork West FieldIrr. Co., 119 Utah 32, 35, 235 P.2d 918, 919 (1951).
4848-3515-2128/GR255 005
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year, regardless of the source of supply."

(R. l:ii.)

In Book 5 of the proposed

determination, the State Engineer wrote that the Canal Company could use 60 cfs of water
for irrigation purposes from April 1 to October 31 and that it could use 20 cfs of water for
stockwatering and domestic use from November 1 to March 31. (R. 1:1143) He also noted
in a footnote that "From April 1 to October 31, inclusive, flow for stockwatering and
domestic is part of flow for irrigation." (Id.) This footnote is the first and only indication that
despite its 1952 diligence claim and its 1969 Water User's Claim, the State Engineer believed
the Canal Company was only entitled to divert a total of 60 cfs during the irrigation season.
According to the State Engineer, Delbert Tidwell, secretary of the Canal Company,
picked up a copy of Book 5 and signed a document entitled "Notice Receipt and Waiver" on
December 15, 1972. (R. 37)

Whether or not Mr. Tidwell actually did so cannot be

ascertained as Mr. Tidwell is deceased and unavailable to testify. (R.145.) On June 8,1973,
John Vetere, president of the Canal Company signed an objection that was stamped filed with
the Seventh District Court on June 20, 1973. (R. 3.) The Canal Company protested the
period of irrigation use recommended by the State Engineer. (Id.) Instead of irrigation being
pemiitted from April 1 to October 31, the Canal Company requested the period "be at least
March 15 to November 15." (Id.) The State Engineer did not contest this objection until
October 31, 2000, when it moved to dismiss the objection as untimely. (R. 31.) According
to the State Engineer's calculation, this objection was 97 days late. See Appellant Brief, 9.
On June 18,1993, the Canal Company submitted two subsequent amendments to its
initial objection. (R. 39, 42.) In one of these amendments, the Canal Company requested
4848-3515-2128/GR255 005
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that "Green River City's claim and water right under 91-39 . . . be declared invalid because
Green River City has failed to apply the water to beneficial use." (R. 40.) In the other
amendment, the Canal Company requested that "[diversion duty for irrigation water rights
in the Green River area, including Green River Canal Company's water right under 91-294,
. .. be set at 6.00 acre feet per acre per calendar year." (R. 43.) The State Engineer did not
respond to these amendments until October 31, 2000.4 (R. 31.)
The Canal Company filed the last supplement to its initial objection on October 14,
1999. (R. 6.) This supplement sought the removal of the language in the State Engineer's
footnote concerning the Canal Company's water user claim in the Proposed Determination
that "[fjrom April 1 to October 31, inclusive, flow for stockwatering and domestic is part of
flow for irrigation." (R. 1:1143.) By including stockwatering and domestic water with
irrigation water, the State Engineer "effectively reduce[d] the Canal Company's diversion
rights during the irrigation season from 80 cfs to 60 cfs total... rendering] the canal system
incapable of delivering irrigation water to all of its shareholders which it has historically been
able to do." (R. 8.) As with Canal Company's previous submissions, the State Engineer did
not respond at all until October 31, 2000. (R. 31.)

4

The State Engineer has recently increased the irrigation duty from four acre feet to
six acre feet, validating the Canal Company's position. See Appellant Brief lOn.l. See also
First Addendum to the Proposed Determination of Water Rights Price River and Lower
Green River Drainage, dated April 4, 2003 ("In response to certain objections to the
Proposed Determination regarding duty, the State Engineer has re-evaluated the duty in Area
91.") (attached as Addendum H). Though not part of the record, this Court may take judicial
notice of this document. See infra n.2. Such action is consistent with his historic practice
of considering meritorious objections filed outside the initial ninety-day objection period.
(R. 149 )
4848-3515-2128/GR255 005
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 31, 2000, the State Engineer filed a motion to dismiss the Canal
Company's objection to the proposed determination and its subsequent amendments, on the
sole ground that the objection was filed outside the ninety-day objection period established
in § 73-4-11 of the Utah Code. (R. 31-32.) Responding to this motion, the Canal Company
asked the district court to exercise its authority under § 73-4-10 of the Utah Code to extend
the time for the Canal Company to file its objection and allow it to be heard on the merits.
The Canal Company argued that the State Engineer's extraordinary twenty-seven year dely
in bringing the motion to dismiss justified the application of the equitable doctrines of laches
or waiver, and that the State Engineer's actions violated the due process clause of the United
States Constitution and the uniform operations of law clause of the Utah Constitution. (R.
64-72.) In addition to responding to the State Engineer's motion, the Canal Company
submitted an alternative motion to dismiss the entire general adjudication for failure to
prosecute or to extend the time for filing objections. (R. 58, 74.) Following oral arguments
and extensive briefing by both parties, the district court denied both parties' motions on
February 7,2003 "except to the extent that this Court's interpretation of the statutory scheme
allows additional time to file the objection herein." (R. 443-44.)
In its memorandum decision, the district court compared the language of §§ 73-4-3
and 73-4-11 of the Utah Code. (R. 439-440.) Section 73-4-3 requires the State Engineer to
give notice of the completion of the State Engineer's water survey "by registered mail or by
personal service" to all claimants involved in the general adjudication. Utah Code Ann. §
4848-3515-2128/GR255 005
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73-4-3 (1989). On the other hand, § 73-4-11 requires the State Engineer "mail[] by regular
mail" notice and a copy of the proposed determination to all claimants. Id. at § 73-4-11.
Looking to the plain language of these sections, the district court determined that "the
Legislative Scheme was and is purposeful - and the Legislature had a reason(s) for drafting
the disparate language in" §§ 73-4-3 and 73-4-11. (R. 442) Thus, the district court held that
§73-4-11 required the State Engineer to mail the proposed determination and that the 90-day
period should not run "until all claimants receive the necessary notice" by mail (R. 440.)
Based on this determination, the district court, invoking equitable powers, attempted
to "construe the statutes to do the least harm possible and by so doing . . . serve the equitable
position that all parties deserve their legitimate day in Court." (R. 442.) Thus, the district
court held as follows:
If all objectors/claimants are to be treated fairly, then all
claimants should have 90 days to present their objections under
73-4-11, and I believe that period should be computed using the
date of the last event, either mailing certificate or waiver which
is on file herein which affects each area. With regard to area
#91,1 conclude that to be June 4, 1974, which is the date of the
last dated Waiver by Joseph Novak.
(R. 442-443 (emphasis in original).) Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the
district court further stated:
I believe equitably speaking, the delay in raising the defense
which the State Engineer's Office now attempts to raise by its'
[sic] Motion to Dismiss gives me equitable groundsfor allowing
the proceedings to go forward and to treat the Green River
Canal's objection as being timely filed and further treating the
"supplementalfilingsff by that company as merely amendments
and/or specifications to the original filing.
4848-3515-2128/GR255 005
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(R. 443.) Because the district court denied its motion to dismiss, the State Engineer filed a
petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order. (R. 447.)
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
For the Court's convenience, the following is a chronology of significant events
pertaining to both the Canal Company's water right and the general adjudication:
Date

Event

Record

June 18, 1952

Canal Company memorialized its 1880 Diligence Claim

Ad. 4

March 20, 1956 General Adjudication begun by Order of Court

Rl:i

Nov. 6, 1969

Canal Company submits Water User Claim 91-294

R.81

May 1, 1972

State Engineer completes the Proposed Determination

R. l:iii

Dec. 15, 1972

Delbert Tidwell purportedly picks up copy of the proposed R. 37
determination and signs the "Notice Receipt and Waiver"

June 8, 1973

Canal Company files initial objection to the Proposed R. 3
Determination

June 18, 1993

Canal Company files a supplemental objection to declare R.40
Green River City's claim invalid

June 18, 1993

Canal Company files a supplemental objection to increase R. 43
the duty to six acre feet

Oct. 13,1999

Canal Company files a final supplemental objection to delete R. 8
the footnote

Oct. 31,2000

State Engineer files a motion to dismiss Canal Company's R. 32
"late" objection and amendments

Feb. 7, 2003

Judge Halliday's Memorandum Decision issued

R.444

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the district court's ruling for three reasons. First, unlike the
State Engineer's mischaracterization of the memorandum decision, the district court properly
4848-3515-2128/GR255 005
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interpreted § 73-4-11. The plain language of § 73-4-11 requires that the State Engineer
"mail[] by regular mail" a copy of the Proposed Determination to each claimant. According
to the statute, each claimant then has "ninety days from such date of mailing" to file a written
objection. Because the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court should
affirm the memorandum decision of the district court. Although the State Engineer argues
that the Canal Company waived its right to such notice, the district court never made a
finding of waiver, and, in any event, the waiver should not be binding under the
circumstances of this case.
Second, the district court properly exercised its discretion in crafting an equitable
remedy to address the facts of this case. Because the State Engineer chose not to act in
accordance with the statute, the district court determined that the ninety-day period should
run from the date the State Engineer last gave notice to any claimant of Book 5 of the
Proposed Determination. The district court's decision to fashion an equitable remedy in the
face of over twenty-seven years of unexplained and unexcused delay and inaction by the
State Engineer was proper and should be affirmed.5
Finally, even if the district court incorrectly interpreted § 73-4-11 or improperly
crafted an equitable remedy, the memorandum decision should still be affirmed because §
73-4-10 allows district courts to extend the time for filing objections to the Proposed
Determination. Even if, arguendo, § 73-4-10 did not apply, the equitable doctrines of laches

5

The State Engineer only states that "general water right adjudications take a long
time." Appellant Brief, 6. He does not even attempt to explain why he waited twenty-seven
years to bring a motion to dismiss the Canal Company's objection.
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or waiver are appropriate alternative bases upon which to affirm the district court's ruling
because of the State Engineer's inaction for over twenty-seven years.
In addition, this Court should also affirm the district court's decision to deem the
Canal Company's supplements to its initial objection as amendments that relate back to the
initial objection for the determination of timely filing.6 Section 73-4-10 grants district courts
the authority to permit amendments to objections in general adjudications.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED § 73-4-11.
In its memorandum decision, the district court interpreted § 73-4-11 of the Utah Code

to require all claimants to receive notice of the State Engineer's proposed determination by
mail. (R. 440.) The district court noted the undisputed fact that "[t]he State Engineer did not
mail by regular mail to the Green River Canal Company a Notice of Proposed
Determination." (R. 440.) In its brief, the State Engineer contends that the Canal Company
waived its right to receive notice by mail and that the Canal Company submitted its objection
more than ninety days from the date it received actual notice of the proposed determination.
However, a plain language analysis of § 73-4-11 and a brief glance at other statutes
governing general adjudications clarifies that notice of the Proposed Determination must be
mailed to claimants in the general adjudication. Other Utah cases support this conclusion.

6

In general adjudications, objections are treated like pleadings. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 73-4-14. The State Engineer files an answer to the objection and the matter is tried before
the district court. Id. at § 73-4-15. Therefore supplements should be treated as amendments
to a complaint.
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Although the State Engineer argues that the Canal Company waived its right to receive
notification by mail, the district court made no such finding, and waiver does not apply to the
circumstances of this case.
A.

A Plain Language Analysis of § 73-4-11 Supports the District Court's
Decision,

As the State Engineer correctly points out, the paramount concern of Utah's appellate
courts when interpreting statutes "is to give effect to the legislative intent, manifested by the
plain language of the statute." State v. Huntington-ClevelandIrr. Co., 2002 UT 75, f 13, 52
P.3d 1257 (citations omitted). This Court further clarified that "[ujnless a statute is
ambiguous, we will not look beyond the plain language of the statute... [and will] 'presume
that the legislature used each word advisedly."' Id. (quoting CT. ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson,
1999 UT 35, Tj 9, 977 P.2d 479 (further quotation and citation omitted)). When looking at
the plain language of the statute, this Court "seek[s] to render all parts [of the statute]
relevant and meaningful." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Conducting a plain
language analysis of § 73-4-11 can lead to only one conclusion - affirmance of the district
court's ruling.
1.

Nature and Purpose of General Adjudications.

The Utah Legislature long ago recognized the need to establish a procedure for filing
an action to determine "the relative rights of the various claimants to the waters o f any
stream or water source in the state. Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-1(1) (1989 & Supp. 2003). The
purposes of establishing a special statutory adjudicative procedure were "to prevent
piecemeal litigation in the determination of water rights and determine them all in one
4848-3515-2128/GR255 005
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action" and "to make a permanent record of such rights by decree of court instead of
permitting the evidence thereof to rest in parole." Mammoth Canal & Irr. Co. v. Burton, 70
Utah 239, 259 P. 408, 410 (1927). The Utah Code specifies the procedures that govern
general adjudications. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-1 to 73-4-24 (1989 & Supp. 2003).
Because general adjudications are statutory creatures not contemplated by our traditional
judicial system, this Court has recognized that "the familiar rules of practice and procedure
by which the courts are guided in ordinary lawsuits do not apply in such cases where the
Legislature has laid down other and different rules relative to a particular subject."
Mammoth Canal & Irr. Co., 259 P. at 411. To emphasize this point, § 73-4-3 states "[i]n all
such cases the court shall proceed to determine the water rights involved in the manner
provided by this chapter, and not otherwise." Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-3.
2.

The plain language of § 73-4-11

In this case, the State Engineer has requested this Court to interpret § 73-4-11,
claiming that the district court's interpretation was flawed. Section 73-4-11 outlines the
procedure for the State Engineer to prepare and submit a "report to the court with his
recommendation of how all rights involved [in a general adjudication] shall be determined."
Id. at § 73-4-11. After the State Engineer has fully considered all Water User's Claims,
surveys, records, and files, and after conducting a "personal examination of the river system
or water source," the State Engineer must create "a proposed determination of all rights to
the use of the water of such river system or water source" involved in the general
adjudication. Id. A copy of the State Engineer's Proposed Detemiination must "be mailed
4848-3515-2128/GR255 005

14

by regular mail to each claimant with notice that any claimant dissatisfied therewith may
within ninety days from such date of mailing file with the clerk of the district court a written
objection thereto duly verified on oath." Id.
The plain language of the statute clearly indicates that the Legislature intended all of
the claimants to receive a copy of the general adjudication by mail. The wording of the
statute is not ambiguous or confusing. Delivery by mail ensures that all claimants receive
notice of the proposed determination at the same time. 'This Court has held that regular
mailing when allowed by statute, as opposed to actual receipt, is sufficient notice." Jensen
v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 290 (Utah 1992). Therefore, this Court should rule that the plain
language of the § 73-4-11 requires notice by mailing.
B.

The Contrast Between §§ 73-4-3 and 73-4-11
1.

Section 73-4-3 contains two methods for providing notice

Had the Legislature intended for service any other way, the statute would have so
stated. In § 73-4-3, the State Engineer must give notice to all claimants in the general
adjudication when a water survey has been completed. This section specifies that notice may
be given to the claimants "by registered mail or by personal service to all claimants whose
names appear on the list" of claimants maintained by the State Engineer. Utah Code Ann.
§ 73-4-3. Claimants have "90 days after such service of such notice . . . [to] file a written
statement with the clerk of the court setting forth his respective claim to the use of such
water." Id. The statute further specifies that "[njotice given by mail shall be complete when
the notice is mailed." Id. According to this statute, either personal service or mailing notice
4848-3515-2128/GR255 005
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by registered mail fulfilled the notice requirement.
2.

The Legislature intended the difference between the statutes

The general adjudication statutes contain different ways of providing notice depending
on the nature of the proceeding. The Legislature specifically provided two methods of
serving notice of the water survey's completion on claimants in § 73-4-3. Service of notice
under this statute is allowed either by mail or by personal service on the claimant. However,
§ 73-4-11 provides only one method of service - by mail. As has already been mentioned,
when interpreting statutes, this Court presumes that the Legislature used each word
advisedly. See Huntington-Cleveland Irr. Co., 2002 UT 75 at f 13. If the Legislature had
intended for the proposed determination to be served on claimants in a general adjudication
any other way, it would have so stated as it did in § 73-4-3. Instead, the Legislature provided
that the proposed determination could only be served on claimants in the general adjudication
by regular mail. Indeed, the Legislature specified that the 90-day period for filing an
objection begin to run "from such date of mailing"

Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1989)

(emphasis added). To interpret § 73-4-11 any other way, this Court would have to ignore the
plain language of the statute.
C.

Other Utah Cases Addressing Notice Require Strict Compliance

In other water rights cases, this Court has long recognized the need to strictly comply
with statutory notice requirements. In Mosby Irrigation Company v. Criddle, 11 Utah 2d 41,
354 P.2d 848 (1960), a water user challenged the decision of the State Engineer to reinstate
an application to appropriate water with a later priority date. Id at 850. The State Engineer
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mailed a letter to the irrigation company's designated representative by registered mail
infomiing it that proof of appropriation was due on a certain date. See id. Because the
irrigation company's designated representative was dead, it never received this letter. After
the due date had passed, the State Engineer sent another letter to the irrigation company
informing it of the lapse of the water right and identifying a procedure for reinstating the
right. The irrigation company responded to this second letter, but because of the lapse, its
application to appropriate was reinstated with a reduced priority date. Id.
On appeal, the irrigation company argued that § 73-3-16, the relevant statute
concerning notice in that case, required "actual receipt of the notice." Mosby, 354 P.2d at
851. However, this Court held that "[t]he legislature has the right to make reasonable
regulations as to public or legal notices, and the statutory requirements must be completely
met in order to effect a valid notice." Id. Because the State Engineer had sent notice as
contemplated by the statute, i.e. by registered mail, its actions complied with the statutory
requirement.
In Longley v. Leucadia Financial Corp, 2000 UT 69, 9 P.3d 762, a water user
challenged a lower court's determination that he had failed to file protest in an administrative
proceeding in a timely manner. The water user alleged that a notice by publication was
deficient and caused his untimely protest. According to the relevant statute, notification of
an extension to put water to a beneficial use had to include information about "the diligence
claimed and the reason for the request." Id. at f 16, (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 73-312(2)(f)(ii)). The notification published did not contain the required information. After
4848-3515-2128/GR255 005
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reviewing cases considering public policy and strict compliance with statutory notification
requirements, this Court overruled both the trial court and the court of appeals, holding that
there "is no reason to treat the statutory notice requirement any less strictly in the water rights
context than we treat it in the putative father and governmental immunity contexts." Id. at
U 22. This Court noted that, just as in the governmental immunity cases, "'[a]ctual notice
does not cure a party's failure to meet"' statutory notice requirements. Id. at f 21 (quoting
Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, If 19, 977 P.2d 1201).
According to this Court's decisions in cases interpreting other statutes of the Water
Code, strict compliance with notice requirements is required. In both Mosby Irrigation
Company and Longley, this Court required notification to be given strictly according to the
method contained in the applicable statutes. A plain language analysis of § 73-4-11 shows
that the State Engineer's proposed determination must be mailed by regular mail to the
affected claimants. It is an uncontested fact that the State Engineer did not mail the
proposed determination to the Canal Company. Therefore, the Canal Company did not
receive proper notice and the ninety-day period did not begin to run from the date of the
signed "Notice Receipt and Waiver" but rather from the date the last such notice was mailed.
D,

The Purported Waiver by the Canal Company Does not Affect the
Outcome of this Case

The State Engineer asserts that the Canal Company expressly waived its right to
receive notice by mail. According to his brief, "the State Engineer has allowed water users
who choose to do so to receive proposed determinations in person." Appellant Brief, 15.
However, the district court never found that the Canal Company expressly waived notice.
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Additionally, cases that the State Engineer cites in support of his waiver argument are
irrelevant to this discussion. Because of the circumstances of this case, the purported waiver
should not be enforced.
1.

The district court made no finding of waiver

According to the State Engineer, a Delbert Tidwell signed a document entitled Notice
Receipt and Waiver on behalf of the Canal Company on December 15, 1972. (R. 37.) This
document states that "the undersigned waives any further service in connection therewith and
consents to the entry of a final decree in this cause unless a formal protest is made by the
undersigned claimant to the above-entitled court within ninety (90) days from and after date
hereof."7 (R. 39.) The State Engineer argues that this purported waiver removed his
obligation to strictly comply with § 73-4-11. The district court, however, did not determine
that the Canal Company had waived its right to notice.
Waiver is defined as "the intentional relinquishment of a known right." Soter's, Inc.
v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc, 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah 1993) (quotation and
citations omitted). This Court has established a three-pronged test to establish waiver, the
elements of which are "(1) an existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of its
existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish the right." Id. at 940 (citations omitted).
Explaining the third element, this Court noted that "the intent to relinquish a right must be
distinct," and in making such a determination, "a fact finder need only determine whether the

7

It must be noted that this language in the alleged waiver form mischaracterizes the
"written objection" provided for in § 73-4-11 as a "formal protest."
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totality of the circumstances 'warrants the inference of relinquishment.5" Id. at 942.
In its memorandum decision, the district court noted as an undisputed fact that the
State Engineer "claims that the Notice, Receipt, and Waiver signed by [Delbert] Tidwell (an
alleged agent of this company) vitiates [the failure to mail notice of the Proposed
Determination] and begins the running of the 90 day objection period from the alleged date
of the Notice, to wit, December 15,1972." (R. 440 (emphasis added).) Although the district
court recognized that the State Engineer's had made such a claim, it did not find that the
claim was valid or that if valid the document actually constituted waiver. Because it
fashioned an equitable remedy that made the question of the validity of waiver irrelevant, the
district court did not make any findings regarding waiver. Should this Court determine,
however, that the waiver is an issue, it must remand this case to the district court for such
findings to be made. See Cazares v. Cosby, 2003 UT 3, f 24, 63 P.3d 1184.
2.

Waiver cannot be established by the facts of this case

Even if waiver need be considered by the district court, facts do not exist to establish
the elements of waiver. Even though waiver may be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence, Setter's, Inc., 857 P,2d at 942 n.6., the State Engineer cannot meet that standard.
The only evidence supporting the contention that the Canal Company waived its right
to receive notice of the Proposed Determination by mail is the "Notice Receipt and Waiver"
purportedly signed by the secretary of the Canal Company, Delbert Tidwell, on December
15, 1972. (R. 37.) This document, however, is not self-authenticating and its validity was
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challenged in the proceedings before the district court.8
The third element of waiver requires a finding of intentional relinquishment. Soter 's
Inc., 857 P.2d at 940. The Canal Company, like all claimants in the general adjudication,
was to receive notice of the proposed determination by mail according to the plain language
of 73-4-11. However, the Notice Receipt and Waiver makes no mention of this notification
right. In fact, the document makes no mention of the statute at all. By signing the document,
a party is only informed that it "waives any further service in connection therewith." (R.39.)
There is no evidence in the record that Delbert Tidwell, who is now dead (R. 142), knew of
the right to receive the Proposed Determination by mail, or that he knew he was waiving the
right to such service and the right to respond within ninety-days of such service. In a case
examining the intentional relinquishment of a right to file suit and submit to mandatory
arbitration, this Court has held that "[w]ithout knowledge that the provision was mandatory,
[a party] could not have intentionally relinquished any right." McCoy v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Utah,2Q0l UT31,f 19,20 P.3d901. Without evidence that Delbert Tidwell knew
of the right he was waiving, there can be no determination that an intentional relinquishment
of the right was made.
As is evidenced by the hundreds of pages of Notice Receipt and Waivers contained
in the record (R. 13, 14, 15), the State Engineer has a policy of avoiding strict compliance

8

The challenges in the district court included the following: that Mr. Tidwell's
signature could not be authenticated, that the document apparently contained the handwriting
of two different individuals, that no copy could be found in the Canal Company's records,
and that there is no evidence that Mr. Tidwell was ever given a copy. (R. 65-66.)
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with the statutory notice requirements by securing "waivers" from claimants to general
adjudications. Instead of complying with the statute, the State Engineer has created a process
that unnecessarily and unfairly lengthens and delays the general adjudication process. Book
5 of the proposed determination, which contained the recommendation concerning the Canal
Company's Water User's Claim, was ready on May 1, 1972. (R. l:iii.) In the record there
are waivers signed by claimants picking up Book 5 of the proposed determination dated from
November 1972 (R.13: tab A (John Arselmo)) until November 1973 (R.14: tab F (Nephi
Foster).)9 It is unclear how ttie claimants were informed of the need to come to the State
Engineer's Office to pick up Iheir copies of the Proposed Determination or what they were
told would happen if they failed to do so.10 However, it is clear that the State Engineer had
no intention of strictly complying with the statute by mailing the Proposed Determination to
the claimants as required by statute.
The State Engineer did not even submit a certificate of filing with the district court
until February 29,2000. (R. 16-17.) This certificate references all of the Notice Receipt and
Waivers and includes several affidavits of service by mailing. (R. 17.) The affidavits of
service indicate that Book 5 was mailed to eighteen claimants on October 23, 1973 (R. 18-

9

There is a Notice Receipt and Waiver signed by Joseph Novak dated June 4, 1974,
but it is unclear whether Mr. Novak, an attorney, obtained the proposed determination on
behalf of a client. (R. 14: tab N) He is not listed as a claimant in the index to Book 5.
10

The Canal Company established by affidavit that the practice and policy of the State
Engineer until 2000 was to consider all objections on their merits regardless of whether or
not they were filed within the ninety-day period in order to make the Final Decree as accurate
as possible. See Affidavit ofHarold D. Donaldson,^ 6 (attached&s Addendum!). (R. 149.)
This affidavit was never challenged by the State Engineer.
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22) and to six claimants on November 14, 1973 (R. 23-24.) There is no evidence in the
record to explain this lapse of over a year between the first signed Notice Receipt and Waiver
and compliance with the statutory requirements of § 73-4-11 by mailing a copy of the
proposed determination to claimants. However, by failing to comply with the statute, the
State Engineer unnecessarily lengthened the time for conducting the general adjudication and
placed certain claimants at an unfair advantage by giving them more time to examine the
proposed determination and the opportunity to review earlier-filed objections. The State
Engineer should not be allowed to rely on the alleged waiver that it obtained through a policy
of ignoring statutory requirements, thereby giving some people over a year to act on the
information, especially when the circumstances of the "waiver" cannot be determined.
3.

The shareholder cases relied upon by the State Engineer are
inapplicable

In support of his argument that the Canal Company could waive its rights to notice,
the State Engineer cites two cases discussing whether shareholders received proper notice
of a shareholders' meeting. See Beggs v. Myton Canal & Irr. Co., 54 Utah 120, 179 P. 984,
987 (1919); Badger v. Madsen, 896 P.2d 20, 23-24 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). In both cases, the
shareholders alleged that the notification they received did not strictly comply with statutory
requirements. See id. In both cases, the courts held that "'if the persons entitled to notice
of corporate meeting actually attend it and participate in the business there transacted, it is
immaterial whether the notice was given in the manner prescribed by statute.'" Badger, 896
P.2d at 24 (quoting Beggs, 179 P. at 987). In these cases, the parties received no harm
because they actually participated in the proceedings. However, in the present case, the State
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Engineer is attempting to prohibit the Canal Company from participating in the general
adjudication, eliminating its ability to challenge the Proposed Determination. In fact, in
Badger, the Court recognized that when "failure to adhere to the requirements will affect a
substantive right of one of the parties and possibly prejudice that party, then courts require
strict compliance" with statutory notification requirements. Badger, 896 P.2d at 23 (quoting
Tech-Fluid Servs., Inc. v. Gavilan Operating Inc., 787 P.2d 1328, 1333 (Utah App. 1990).
By attempting to dismiss the objection, the State Engineer is affecting the Canal Company's
substantive right to have its objection heard on the merits.
Instead of supporting the State Engineer's position, these cases actually support both
the Canal Company's position and the district court's ruling that the State Engineer should
have (but failed to) strictly comply with the statute. Because of the prejudicial loss of Canal
Company's substantive right to challenge the Proposed Determination and to prove that the
Proposed Determination should be modified, strict compliance with the notification
requirements of § 73-4-11 should be required of the State Engineer.
4.

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.

The State Engineer also argues that a United States Supreme Court case allows
personal service to substitute for strict compliance with statutory notice requirements. In
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865
(1950), the United States Supreme Court considered whether publication of notice in a
newspaper was constitutionally adequate under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 307. The
Court noted that due process is satisfied when notice "is reasonably calculated, under all the
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circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections." Id. at 314. The State Engineer cites this case to
support his contention that "[pjersonal service of written notice . . . [is] always adequate in
any type of proceeding." Id. at 313, Appellant Brief, 16. In Mullane, however, the Supreme
Court determined that notification by mail was appropriate. See id. at 319. As in the present
case, Mullane involved "a large number of. . . interests." Id. However, the case does not
create a hierarchy of notice or a carte blanche right to ignore statutory notice requirements,
nor does it establish, as the State Engineer asserts, that personal service provides "a higher
form of service than service by mail." Appellant Brief 16. Rather, Mullane states simply
that due process is met by any service reasonably calculated to provide interested parties with
the opportunity to address and object to claims.
The cases cited by the State Engineer do not support his conclusion that the Canal
Company actually waived its right to notice by mailing, and the district court made no finding
on the existence or absence of waiver. Therefore, the State Engineer's waiver arguments are
unavailing.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT DEVELOPED AN APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE
REMEDY
The State Engineer argues that the district court erred in considering the Canal

Company's equitable arguments. Appellant Brief 27. According precedent laid down by
this Court, the district court's consideration of the Canal Company's equitable arguments,
to the extent that it did consider them, was entirely appropriate. "It is well established that
equitable defenses may be applied in actions at law and that principles of equity apply
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wherever necessaiy to prevent injustice." Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah
1987). When fashioning an equitable remedy, "a trial court is accorded considerable latitude
and discretion." United States Fuel Co, v. Huntington-ClevelandIrr. Co., 2003 UT 49, f 9,
79 P.3d 945. Because the district court fashioned an appropriate equitable remedy, its
decision should be affirmed.
A.

After Properly Interpreting the Statute, an Equitable Remedy was
Needed

Once the district court determined that § 73-4-11 required notice of the Proposed
Determination be sent to claimants in general adjudications by mail, it faced the problem that
the Canal Company never received notification by mail. The district court specified as an
undisputed fact that u[t]he State Engineer did not mail by regular mail to the [Canal
Company] a Notice of Proposed Determination." (R. 440.) Because mailing did not occur,
the running of the ninety-day period could not begin to run "from the time of such mailing."
Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11. Therefore, the district court needed to fashion an equitable
remedy to resolve the issue of timing. Because of the State Engineer's failure to "strictly
comply with the statutory language . . . and its delay in raising the defense" of timeliness, the
district court determined "to treat the [Canal Company's] objection as being timely filed."
(R. 443.) This decision is supported not only be the State Engineer's actions (or more
specifically inactions) but also by the evidentiary problems that now exist because twentyseven years expired before any action was taken by the State Engineer.
1.
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This case suffers from problems that must be anticipated when proceedings have
lingered for nearly fifty years. The State Engineer's motion to dismiss is based on a "Notice
Receipt and Waiver" form purportedly signed by Delbert Tidwell, the secretary of the Canal
Company, on December 15, 1972. However, Delbert Tidwell is dead. (R. 142.) No
testimony can be obtained from him regarding the circumstances existing at the time he
received the Proposed Determination, including what he may have been told by employees
of the State Engineer in light of the undisputed policy of that office not to challenge
objections on timeliness grounds. (R.149.) We do not know if a copy of the Notice Receipt
and Waiver was retained by Mr. Tidwell or was even provided by the State Engineer. The
Canal Company's records do not contain the Notice Receipt and Waiver or the Proposed
Determination books supposedly given to Mr. Tidwell. (R. 66,141-42.) The Canal Company
is not alone in the loss of key evidence and witnesses; the State Engineer has also lost several
key personnel involved in the prosecution of this general adjudication. None of these
problems would have arisen had the State Engineer not waited nearly three decades to act.
Finally, the court record of the general adjudication is inadequate. The district court
docket contains very few records prior to 2000. (R. 153.) Because there is not a docket of
what was filed before 2000, the district court file may be incomplete. The file for this case
has been stored in boxes at the Seventh District Court, which clerks were on at least one
occasion unable to locate. (R. 153) Because of the incomplete docket and inadequate filing,
it is impossible to determine whether the court file actually contains all the documents that
have been submitted over the years. (Id.) While admittedly speculative, it is entirely possible
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that the Canal Company submitted a timely objection that has since been lost. Over the
decades,11 much of the evidence has been lost, and determining the circumstances
surrounding the receipt of the Proposed Determination has become nearly (if not entirely)
impossible. This long delay supports the equitable remedy fashioned by the district court.
2.

The State Engineer has routinely allowed other late objections

In addition to the long passage of time, the State Engineer's own actions in this very
same general adjudication support the equitable remedy fashioned by the district court.
While the State Engineer moved to dismiss the Canal Company's objection because it was
untimely, he has embraced other late objections and treated other claimants more favorably.
In fact, this was undisputedly his practice until 2000. (R. 149.) The State Engineer argues
that there is no relationship between his actions towards these other claimants and his actions
towards the Canal Company. Though the State Engineer argues that this Court should strictly
apply the ninety-day period to the Canal Company's objection, the examples that follow
demonstrate that his practice has not been to seek strict application the statute. By treating
claimants differently, the State Engineer has prejudiced the Canal Company in his effort to
keep the Canal Company's claim from being decided on the merits.
On November 14, 1973, the State Engineer mailed a copy of the Proposed

11

Richard Nixon was still in the White House, The Godfather was a brand new film,
and the United States was still fighting in Vietnam when the Canal Company filed its initial
objection. An entire generation has slowly passed away while the State Engineer has silently
ignored the Canal Company's objection, only to suddenly act nearly three decades later, after
living memory has vanished into the grave and recorded evidence has been lost to the
relentless passage of time.
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Determination to Sam Sampinos (the predecessor to Eureka Energy). (R. 238.) Eureka
Energy filed an objection with the district court on January 23,1981, over seven years later.
(R. 239-40.) Although on April 25,2000, the State Engineer moved to dismiss the claim for
several reasons, including the untimeliness of the objection, he nevertheless requested the
district court hear the merits of the objection. (R. 243.)
On November 29,1972, J. Clarence and Kate W. Ingram signed a Notice Receipt and
Wavier. (R. 246.) They filed an objection to the Proposed Determination on April 12,1973,
135 days late. (R. 247.) Although the State Engineer challenged the objection on April 25,
2000, he did not move to dismiss for untimeliness and requested that the Proposed
Determination be amended. (R. 250-51.)
On November 13, 1972, the attorney for Kaiser Steel Corp. signed a Notice Receipt
and Waiver indicating receipt of the Proposed Determination. (R. 254.) The district court
received Kaiser Steel Corp.'s objection to the Proposed Determination on August 2, 1973 over eight months late. (R. 255.) On April 25, 2000, the State Engineer answered Kaiser
Steel Corp.'s objection. (R. 265.) He did not move to dismiss the objection for Kaiser Steel
Corp.'s failure to file the objection in a timely manner but requested that the Proposed
Determination be amended in conformity with the objection. (R. 265.)
On January 30,1973, James W. Fausett signed a Notice Receipt and Waiver indicating
receipt of a copy of the Proposed Determination. (R. 268.) Mr. Fausett submitted an
objection notarized on October 29,1973, but it was not filed with the district court until June
18, 1976, almost three years later. (R. 269.) The State Engineer answered this objection on
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April 25, 2000, and requested either that the objection be dismissed as untimely or that the
Proposed Determination be modified. (R. 271-72.)
On November 3, 1972, Calvin K. Jacob and Milton E. Jacob each signed, a Notice
Receipt and Waiver indicating receipt of the Proposed Determination. (R. 275.) On August
21, 1973, their joint objection was notarized (it does not indicate when it was filed with the
district court). (R. 276.) The State Engineer answered the Jacobs' objection on April 25,
2000, arguing that it should be dismissed as untimely, but nevertheless requesting that the
substance of the objection be added in an addendum to the Proposed Determination. (R.
279.)
In light of the State Engineer's acceptance of the content of these objections even
though he nominally asserted that the objections were untimely, the State Engineer is in no
position to question the equitable remedy fashioned by the district court. Given the State
Engineer's actions on other objections filed after the expiration of the ninety-day period, the
district court's decision to treat the Canal Company's objection as timely was and is
completely appropriate.
B.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion

When a district court invokes its equitable powers to fashion a remedy in a given
situation, it "is accorded considerable latitude." United States Fuel Co., 2003 UT 49, at f 9
(citations omitted) Because of the State Engineer's delay and failure to strictly comply with
the statute, the district court fashioned a remedy that would allow the Canal Company's
objections to be heard on the merits. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it
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fashioned this remedy. Therefore, this Court should affirm the decision of the district court.
Ill-

EVEN IF THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY INTERPRETED § 73-4-11
THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD ON OTHER GROUNDS
Even if, arguendo, this Court determines that the district court erroneously interpreted

§ 73 -4-11 or improperly crafted an equitable remedy and that the Canal Company's obj ection
was indeed filed late, the district court's Memorandum Decision should still be upheld. This
court has noted that it "may affirm a trial court's decision on any proper ground(s), despite
the trial court's having assigned another reason for its ruling." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc.,
2003 UT 41, | 23 n.8, 82 P.3d 1064 (quoting Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co., 949 P.2d 337,342 n.3 (Utah 1997) (quoting Buehner Block Co. v. UWCAssocs.,
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988))). Because of § 73-4-10 and/or the equitable doctrines of
laches or waiver, this Court may if necessary affirm the district court's ruling on other
grounds.
A.

Section 73-4-10 Allows for the Extension of Time

According to § 73-4-10, the district court has "power . . . to extend, upon due cause
shown, the time for filing any other pleading, statement, report or protest." Utah Code Ann.
§ 73-4-10 (1989). The plain language of this statute grants the district court the authority to
consider an objection to the Proposed Determination filed beyond the ninety day statutory
period. The State Engineer argues that case law prohibits late objections in general
adjudications and that § 73-4-10 allows only prospective, not retroactive extensions.
1.

The Canal Company established due cause

According to § 73-4-10, a court may "extend, upon due cause shown, the time for
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filing any. ..protest." Utah Code Ann. 73-4-10 (1989). The Canal Company has shown due
cause why the ninety-day period should be extended to allow its original objection to be
considered timely filed. As the Canal Company's objection will be determined on its merits,
there is no prejudice to other parties,12 and where prejudice to the Canal Company is great,
due cause exists to excuse the untimely filing.
While Utah appellate courts have not addressed the "due cause" standard, other courts
have. The Supreme Court of New Mexico has explained that the "due cause" test "is one of
objective reasonableness." Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 918 P.2d 350, 363 (N.M. 1996).
Pennsylvania courts have equated due cause to reasonable cause and have noted that trial
courts "have the discretion to determine from the record whether due cause exists." In re
Petition to Increase Mileage Limit Levied on Real Estate from 25 Mills to 30 Mills, 646 A.2d
61, 65 n.5 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994); In re Petition of City ofClairton, 694 A.2d 372, 374 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1997). The State Engineer argues that the Canal Company "offered no
evidence or explanation of any circumstance to justify or excuse its late filing of the 1973
Objection or any of the other objections." Appellant Brief 28. Contrary to the State
Engineer's assertion, the Canal Company provided ample evidence to show due cause.
The State Engineer insists that the Canal Company has "the burden of demonstrating
that it had due cause for filing the objections late." Appellant Brief 28. The Canal Company

12

While Lee Thayn and Green River City (the other water users who could claim to
be prejudiced by the extension because they hold or held the right to divert water from the
same point of diversion on the Green River) appeared in the proceeding before the district
court, neither filed any objection to the extension either before the district court or here.
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has established due cause to extend the time for filing because the State Engineer
inexplicably delayed bringing his motion to dismiss for twenty-seven years, resulting in the
loss of evidence and prejudicing the Canal Company by allowing it to believe and act on the
assumption that its objections would be heard.13
The State Engineer's position is that the Canal Company must show that due cause
existed in 1973 to extend the time for filing. This argument misses the point. Section 73-410 does not limit the showing of due cause to any particular time period. The untimeliness
of the Canal Company's objection was not challenged until 2000. At that time, the Canal
Company explained why due cause now exists to justify the extension of time and permit the
adjudication of its objection on the merits. Due cause must exist at the time the petition for
extension is made, and that petition was made on December 1, 2000. Because the Canal
Company has shown that the intervening twenty-seven years caused witnesses and
documents to disappear, the State Engineer's too-long delayed action establishes due cause
to extend the time for filing the objection in 1973. The district court extended the timeperiod for filing the objection by determining that the ninety days began to run following the
last certificate of mailing or waiver signed by claimants receiving Book 5 of the Proposed
Determination. (R. 442-44.) The grant of an extension is reviewed by this Court for abuseof-discretion. See, e.g., Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299, 13 P.3d 616
(reviewing extension of time for appeal under URAP Rule 4(e)); Julian v. State, 966 P.2d

13

Indeed, this was undisputedly the policy of the State Engineer until October of 2000.
(R. 149.)
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249, 254 (Utah 1998) (reviewing grant of extension for habeas corpus petition).
2.

Section 73-4-10 allows retroactive extensions of time

The State Engineer argues that granting retroactive extensions of time to claimants
under § 73-4-10 to file late objections causes § 73-4-11 to become superfluous and
inoperative. Appellant Brief, 24. A brief glance at other statutes regarding general
adjudications indicates the contrary. Additionally, despite the State Engineer's argument that
§ 73-4-11 should be treated as jurisdictional, Utah case law holds otherwise.
a.

The general adjudication statutes are inclusive

When a general adjudication is initiated, the State Engineer must give notice to water
users along the river system or water source who may be potential claimants that the general
adjudication is now pending in district court. The State Engineer must "publishf] notice once
a week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper designated by the court as most likely to
give notice to such claimants." Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-3 (1989). This notice must inform
potential claimants that they must "notify the state engineer within 90 days from the date
notice is given of their names and addresses." Id. After the expiration of ninety days, the
State Engineer must prepare a list of all claimants, certify that the list is complete, and submit
the list to the district court. See id. However, the statute permits the list to be amended
beyond the ninety-day period to include tardy or additional claimants. "The court upon
petition may by order permit the addition of names and addresses to this list at any time
during the pendency of the action." Id. Using the State Engineer's logic, this ninety-day
period in § 73-4-3 for responding to notice once the general adjudication is initiated would
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be considered superfluous and inoperative. However, the Legislature purposefully created
a method for updating the general adjudication in this section.
This language demonstrates that the general adjudication statute was designed to be
inclusive, not exclusive. When adjudicating the rights of all water users along an entire river
system or water source, the State Engineer and the Court must ensure that all claimants
receive an opportunity to be heard. Of course, it would be impossible to leave a general
adjudication open and unending; however, the Legislature recognized the need to add
additional claimants even after the ninety-day period has expired for interested claimants to
register. Thus, it would seem that the time limits imposed in the general adjudication were
established more in the interest of expediting a huge undertaking than to create technical
deadlines excluding claimants from having their objections heard on the merits.
As the State Engineer points out numerous times, "general water right adjudications
take a long time." Appellant Brief, 6. This particular general adjudication has taken an
extremely long time. Since its initiation in 1956 (R. l:i), nearly fifty years have passed and
yet no final decree has issued. The State Engineer completed his proposed determination in
this general adjudication in 1972, yet the general adjudication is still open.14 Over this long
period of time, the number of water users along the Green River has likely increased, the uses

14

It would seem that in 1972 the bulk of the work (i.e., reviewing water user's claims,
inspecting the drainage area, mapping hydrographic surveys, and fashioning the Proposed
Determination) was complete. The only task left being to resolve objections to the Proposed
Determination in order to obtain a final decree. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-15, -17 (1989).
However, the State Engineer took no action regarding the Canal Company's objection until
2000.
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of water have necessarily changed, the course of creeks and streams could have changed, the
needs of the water users have changed, and even the climate and weather patterns may have
changed. A general adjudication cannot be expected to occur by taking a snapshot of the
water users in 1972 and expect twenty-seven years later (when the motion to dismiss was
filed) or thirty-one years later (when this brief was filed) that everything has remained the
same. A general adjudication was never intended to be limited to the information available
only at a certain moment in time. A general adjudication is not static like regular civil
proceedings. It is dynamic—like the nature of water itself.
In fact, the State Engineer recognized the need to make changes to the general
adjudication and to his Proposed Determination. In oral arguments before the district court,
the State Engineer admitted "we feel like it's imperative that the State Engineer has to have
the ability, if there's mistakes in the proposed determination, to correct those mistakes." (R.
454:30:10-12.) The State Engineer also stated "[w]e recognize at times that some - some of
the things that we put in the proposed determination are mistakes and - and we feel - or we
believe that in fairness we should have - we should be able to correct that in fairness to the
water users."15 (R. 454:31:20-24.) The State Engineer recognizes that it is important to be
fair to all water users in conducting general adjudications.16

15

From this statement, it appears that the State Engineer believes that he (rather than
the courts) has the authority to determine the merits of objections to the Proposed
Determination.
16

Despite these admissions concerning his practice of accepting and acting upon late
objections and despite acting favorably upon the portion of the Canal Company's objection
seeking an increase in irrigation duty from four to six acre feet, the State Engineer seeks to
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The Legislature recognized the need to allow the general adjudication to be dynamic
and allow for changes during its long pendency. It allows for new claimants to be added to
the general adjudication. It allows for the court to permit amendments and to extend
deadlines for filings. The State Engineer has admitted that when mistakes occur in a
proposed determination, they need to be corrected, whether or not the objection giving notice
of the mistake is received late. As the Legislature intended, the courts have the discretion
to allow for changes while the general adjudication is proceeding. In this case, the district
court properly exercised its discretion to allow the Canal Company's initial objection to be
considered timely.
b.

Other statutes do not limit retroactive application

The State Engineer argues that § 73-4-10 cannot be retroactively applied. According
to the State Engineer, § 73-4-11 is jurisdictional "like section 63-30-12 [of the Governmental
Immunity Act] and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." Appellant Brief, 26.
However, as the United States Supreme Court has noted, the time restrictions in certain
statutes are not jurisdictional prerequisites "but a requirement that, like a statute of
limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling." Zipes v. Trans World
Airlines Inc., 455 U.S. 385,393, 102 S.Ct. 1127,71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982), and therefore can
be modified retroactively. According to this analysis, § 73-4-11 is not jurisdictional.
The first problem with the comparison of § 73-4-11 to § 63-30-12 and Rule 4 is that
the district court already had jurisdiction over the Canal Company and its Water User's

strictly apply the ninety-day period in this one instance.
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Claim. The Canal Company became a participant in the general adjudication when it
indicated that it held a water right along the Green River and filed its Water User's Claim.
Compliance or non-compliance with § 73-4-11 is irrelevant to the jurisdiction of the district
court. Once a general adjudication is initiated, the district court has jurisdiction over all
claimants who have filed water user claims pursuant to § 73-4-3. As has already been
explained, claimants can constantly be added to the general adjudication under § 73-4-3 upon
petition to the district court. Therefore, there can be no question that the district court had
jurisdiction over the Canal Company and its claim
Additionally, § 63-30-12 and rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure both
require notice of an intent to file an action before the action can actually be taken. Section
63-30-12 states "[a] claim against the state . . . is barred unless notice of claim is filed . . .
within one year after the claim arises." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (2003 Supp.) (emphasis
added). Rule 4 states "notice of appeal. . . shall be filed with the clerk of the court within
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." However, these
requirements have been held to be "precondition^] to the bringing o f an action. Madson
v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has noted that such
requirements "creating a 'condition precedent' to commencing an action create a
precondition to suit and that a party's failure to satisfy a precondition results in an
adjudication for 'lack of jurisdiction.'" McBride-Williams v. Huard, 2004 UT 21, \ 12.
Unlike these notices, objections to the Proposed Determination are not preconditions to suit.
As the United States Supreme Court has ruled, such statutory requirements "are
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subject to waiver" and other equitable claims. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393. This Court has also
recently held that rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is not an absolute bar to
obtaining jurisdiction for appellate review. Noting that rule 4(e) contains a "good cause"
exception to the timely filing requirement, this Court stated "the recognition that there will
arise circumstances when an inflexible application of the rule 4(a) deadlines would result in
unconscionable injustices." State ex rel. M.M., A.M., and S.S. (T.S. v. State), 2003 UT 54,
Tf 10, 82 P.3d 1104. Even though rule 4 has a mandatory time period for filing notices of
appeal, it need not be applied inflexibly in all cases.
Thus, § 73-4-11 is not jurisdictional and the ninety-day time period is subject to
extension, waiver, and laches. It need not be inflexibly applied. In addition, the statutes
cited by the State Engineer in favor of an absolute bar do not necessarily require the
suggested unbending, strict enforcement.
3.

Utah case law does not support the State Engineer's position

According to the State Engineer, this Court's recent determination in United States
Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49,79 P.3d 945, and the holdings
in related cases preclude courts from excusing late objections in general adjudications. The
State Engineer misreads these cases and incorrectly concludes that these cases support his
position, when in reality, they indicate that late objections may be excused.
In United States Fuel Co., this Court considered whether a district court had properly
decided "an action to quiet title to a prior right to use water from Cedar Creek." Id. at 1 1 .
Although the State-Engineer's proposed determination gave Huntington-Cleveland Canal
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Company (Huntington-Cleveland) a senior irrigation right, United States Fuel Company
(USF) brought a private claim outside of the general adjudication to assert its priority right
to the water claimed in the general adjudication by Huntington-Cleveland. Id. at f 5. USF
had also filed an objection to the proposed determination in the general adjudication, but its
objection was filed one day late. Id. at f 4.
On appeal, this Court held that the State Engineer's proposed determination "cannot
coexist with the prosecution of an independent action which could result in a judgment
inconsistent with an uncontested portion of a proposed determination." Id. at \ 12. This
Court noted that the Water Code mandates that "courts must render judgment in accordance
with a proposed determination where the proposed determination is uncontested at the close
of the ninety-day statutory period." Id. at f 15 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-12). Because
USF's objection was filed late in the general adjudication, Huntington-Cleveland "was
entitled to judgment perfecting the state engineer's" proposed determination. Id. at % 17.
Although this Court held that Huntington-Cleveland was entitled to seek judgment in the
general adjudication, it did not foreclose USF from obtaining leave to file a late objection.
This Court qualified the right of Huntington-Cleveland to obtain judgment based on
the uncontested portion of the State Engineer's proposed determination. First, this Court
stated that Huntington-Cleveland was entitled to judgment "[ujnless and until USF sought
and obtained leave of court in the general adjudication to excuse its tardy objection." Id. at
T[ 17. This Court also noted "that USF should be compelled to seek relief for its untimelyfiled objection to [Huntington-Cleveland's] claim" in the general adjudication. Id. at ^ 21.
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Thus, the holding in United States Fuel Co. recognized that USF could have sought to have
its late objection excused had it applied for such relief in the general adjudication. Although
it found that USF had failed to file an objection within the ninety-day statutory period, this
Court did not preclude USF from seeking relief in the general adjudication.
The State Engineer also relies on the holdings in Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287,
290-91 (Utah 1992) md Hicken v. North Ditch Irrigation Co., No. 960360-CA, at 2 (Utah
Ct. App., March 20, 1997). In both of those cases, a lower court's decision to dismiss a
claimant's objection to the State Engineer's proposed determination was upheld because the
claimant had filed the objection late. Id. However, neither of these cases analyzed the
impact of § 73-4-10 on the matter, nor does it appear that the claimants sought to have their
late objection excused pursuant to that section.
In the present case, the Canal Company responded to the State Engineer's motion to
dismiss by moving the district court to excuse its late objection. (R. 59.) For over twentyseven years, the Canal Company had no indication that it had filed its objection late. As soon
as the State Engineer made the Canal Company aware of the timeliness issue, the Canal
Company moved for an extension of time. However, because the district court ruled that the
Canal Company's filing was timely, the request to excuse the tardy filing was never
addressed. Should this Court determine that the Canal Company's objection was untimely
filed, it should nevertheless affirm the decision to the district court because § 73-4-10 grants
authority to excuse late filings.
B.

The District Court's Decision May be Affirmed under the Alternative
Equitable Doctrine of Laches
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Even if this Court was to determine that § 73-4-10 does not give the district court
discretion to extend the time for filing objections, the equitable doctrine of laches should
prohibit the State Engineer pursuing a motion to dismiss filed twenty-seven years late.
Outside of the general adjudication, "a defendant's usual recourse for a plaintiffs failure to
proceed with the litigation consists of filing a motion to dismiss for the failure to prosecute"
under rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; however, as the State Engineer suggests,
such recourse is unavailable here. (R. 167.) Therefore, the equitable doctrine of laches is
an appropriate remedy given the State Engineer's unjustified twenty-seven year delay.
Laches is an equitable doctrine, and equity demands that it be applied in this case to
avoid injustice and prejudice to the Canal Company. As the court of appeals has noted,
"[l]aches is an equitable doctrine 'based on the maxim that equity aids the vigilant, not those
who slumber on their rights.'" Nilson-Newey & Co. v. Utah Resources Int'l, 905 P.2d 312,
314 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Almeida v. Almeida, 669 P.2d 174, 180 (Haw. Ct. App.
1983) (other quotation and citation omitted)). Other courts have noted that "[l]aches is an
equitable doctrine which may be invoked when delay by one party works to the disadvantage
of the other, causing a change of circumstances which would make the grant of relief to the
delaying party inequitable." Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Public Works Bd., 836
P.2d633, 636-37 (Nev. 1992). The State Engineer's twenty-seven year delay has caused the
Canal Company to rely on the fact that its objection would be heard on the merits.
According to Utah case law, "[t]o successfully assert laches one must establish that
(1) plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action, and (2) defendants were prejudiced
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by that delay." Nielson-Newey, 905 P.2dat 314 (citing Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799
P.2d 716, 726 (Utah App. 1990). Clearly, the first element of laches is met. The State
Engineer brought this motion to dismiss twenty-seven years after the Canal Company's
objection was filed. No excuse, whether it is lack of funding or the State Engineer's bald
assertion that "general water rights adjudications take a long time," justifies this long delay.
The prejudice element is also met in this case. In Nilson-Newey, the court of appeals
upheld the trial court's dismissal of an action based on the doctrine of laches because the
plaintiff failed to bring an action for an accounting and distribution of profits for over 35
years. Id. at 316. The court noted the defendants' disadvantage because umany of the
documents that might clarify these transactions are no longer available . . . that all but one
of the original syndicate members is dead, and that witnesses who might clarify existing
records and documents substantiating the current controverted relationship are dead." Id.
Because of these difficulties, the court held "that defendants would be disadvantaged if
plaintiff were allowed to prosecute its claims." Id.
Numerous other courts have stated that the loss of evidence due to another party's
unreasonable delay constitutes injury sufficient to apply laches. See e.g., Fontana v.
Steenson, 929 P.2d 336, 339 (Or. App. 1996) (prejudice may be shown "by showing that a
plaintiffs delay caused the loss of critical documentary evidence"); Maletis, Inc. v. Schmitt
Forge, Inc., 870 P.2d 865, 868 (Or. App. 1994) ("prejudice may take the form of a
disadvantageous change in position, or a loss of witnesses or documents"); Anderson v.
Anderson, 585 P.2d 938, 947 (Haw. 1978) (stating that laches applies when, "'during
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inexcusable delay, the evidence has become obscured and, under the circumstances of the
case, it is too late to ascertain the merits of the controversy'" (citation omitted)).
In this case, the Canal Company faces similar disadvantages. Due to the passage of
so many years, records have been lost or inadvertently misplaced, witnesses' memories have
faded, and key witnesses have died. (R. 65-67.) Because of the loss of so much evidence,
the Canal Company has not been able adequately respond to the State Engineer's allegations.
Additionally, the State Engineer's only support for its motion to dismiss is a document of
questionable evidentiary value. For over twenty-seven years, the Canal Company believed
that its objection wras valid and would be considered in the general adjudication. It has now
acted for over thirty years on the assumption that its objection was timely. For the State
Engineer now to seek dismissal of the Canal Company's claims is obviously inequitable.
Because both elements of the laches exist, this Court could uphold the district court's ruling
on this alternative basis.
C.

The District Court's Decision can be Affirmed Under the Alternative
Equitable Doctrine of Waiver by the State Engineer

The equitable doctrine of waiver provides an additional ground upon which this Court
could uphold the district court's decision should it determine that the district court
improperly interpreted § 73-4-11. As has been mentioned earlier, "'[a] waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing
right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it.'"
Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan Ass % 857P.2d935,942 (Utah 1993) (quoting
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 P.2d 308, 311-12 (1936)). Waiver may be
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inferred by "the totality of the circumstances." Id. Silence may constitute waiver if "there
is some duty or obligation to speak." Id. at 940 (quotation and citation omitted). By its
silence for more that twenty-seven years, the State Engineer has waived his right to seek
dismissal of the Canal Company's objection.
The State Engineer has a statutory duty to aid the court in the general adjudication.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-1(1), -14 (1989 & Supp. 2003). It was therefore the State
Engineer's duty to monitor the responses and objections to the Proposed Determination, at
least within some reasonable time. However, the State Engineer apparently failed to comply
with this obligation. Just as there is a time limit on when a water claimant may protest the
proposed determination, there should be some reasonable time limit within which the State
Engineer must challenge the objection and hearing be had regarding the same.
In addition, the State Engineer has acted differently concerning the untimely
complaints of other water users. In several cases, the State Engineer answered objections and
requested that the proposed determination be modified or that an addendum be added to the
proposed determination pursuant to those objections. Each of these objections, like the Canal
Company's, was filed after the expiration of the ninety-day objection period. Despite the
lateness of these objections, however, the State Engineer requested that each objection be
fully or at least partially considered on the merits. (R. 149.) The State Engineer has not
afforded the Canal Company the same deference to its meritorious objection.17 For reasons

17

The State Engineer has never challenged the veracity of Jack Barnett's affidavit
testimony, presented in support of the Canal Company's objection to the reduction of the
Canal Company's water right to 60 rather than the necessary 80 cfs.
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unknown to the Canal Company, the State Engineer has determined to treat the Canal
Company differently by seeking to dismiss its objections without consideration on the merits
while recommending that other untimely objections be incorporated into the proposed
determination. By waiving his right to reject untimely objections submitted by other
claimants, the State Engineer has also waived his right to reject the Canal Company's
objections.
By failing to act for over twenty-seven years when he had a duty to do so, the State
Engineer has waived his opportunity to dismiss the Canal Company's objections for
untimeliness.18 Because waiver is an appropriate equitable remedy, this Court should uphold
the district court's decision even if it determines that other reasons do not.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED SUPPLEMENTS TO
THE OBJECTION AS AMENDMENTS TO THE ORIGINAL OBJECTION
In its memorandum decision, the district court ruled that the Canal Company's initial

objection was timely filed and that "the 'supplemental filings'... [were] merely amendments
and/or specifications to the original filing." (R. 443.) According to § 73-4-10, the district
court has the "power to allow amendments to any petition, statement or pleading." If this
Court determines that the Canal Company's original pleading was timely, then the district
court's decision to consider the Canal Company's subsequent objections as amendments to
the original should also be affirmed because the district court did not abuse his discretion.

18

It is ironic that the State Engineer is attempting to dismiss an objection that was,
according to the State Engineer, 93 days late by filing a motion to dismiss twenty-seven
years, or over 9855 days, later.
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See Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, Tf 31, 84 P.3d 1154.
According to the State Engineer, "the major reason for the statutory time limit for
filing objections is so water users have notice of issues that affect their water rights
[and] "[supplemental' or 'amended' objections that raise new issues subvert this purpose."19
Appellant Brief, 34. The State Engineer asserts that §§ 73-4-11 and 73-4-10 act as a bar to
new issues raised by "cunning water users."20 Id. Additionally, the State Engineer asserts
that the word "objection" or "protest" does not appear in the list of amendable documents in
§ 73-4-10. The State Engineer's arguments are hypertechnical and cannot withstand close
scrutiny.
In similar situations, this Court has held that trial courts may permit amendments to
claims even though certain statutory time limits have passed. In Meyers v. Interwest Corp.,
632 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah 1981), the dispute concerned "a defect on the face of the summons

19

Of course, if this is the main purpose for the statutory time limit, then it also supports
the conclusion that the statutory time limit exists to ensure that all claimants receive notice
of the proposed determination at the same time and that all objections are required to be filed
at the same time also, i.e., ninety days after mailing, so that water users all promptly "receive
notice of issues that affect their water rights." Appellant Brief, 34. As has already been
mentioned, this Court has held that another purpose of the general adjudication is to avoid
piecemeal litigation. See Mammoth Canal & Irr. Co. v. Burton, 70 Utah 239, 259 P. 408,
410 (1927). The practice of the State Engineer to distribute the Proposed Determination
randomly over several years does exactly the opposite.
20

All the State Engineer needs to do to prevent "cunning water users" from amending
their objection is to timely file an answer to such objections. The goal of general
adjudications should not be to avoid adjudications of the merits of water user's claims. On
the contrary, the goal is to achieve the most correct and accurate adjudication of all rights in
a particular drainage area. All the Canal Company desires is the right to have its day in court
and to attempt to prove it needs 80 cfs.
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served on defendant." On appeal, this Court noted that "Rule 4(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure specifically allows an amendment to be made to the summons 'at any time."' Id.
at 881. Even though the statute of limitations ran prior to the filing of the motion to amend,
"the amendment relates back to the initial summons." Id. at 882. In support of this holding,
this Court noted that Rule 15(e), concerning amendments to complaints, also permits
amendments to "relate back to the initial filing of the complaint . . . notwithstanding the
intervening running of a statute of limitations." Id. Such rules are "liberally construed to
afford litigants their day in court on the merits of their claim." Id. Finally, this Court stated
"[i]n the absence of prejudice, it is appropriate to pursue that policy which favors resolution
of disputes on the merits rather than technicalities."

Id.

According to this Court,

amendments should be liberally allowed in the interest ofjustice and relate back to the initial
filing even though statutory time periods have run.
In Lawson v. McBride, 71 Utah 239, 264 P. 727 (1928), a water user appealed a
decree entered by a district court concerning the extent and nature of the water user's water
right. On review, this Court reversed the decree based on its determination that it was against
the clear weight of the evidence. Id. at 729. Additionally, this Court held that the district
court "erred in not permitting the plaintiff to amend his complaint" to conform to the
evidence. Id. In that case, the district court abused its discretion by denying the water user
to opportunity to amend. In this case, the district court appropriately exercised its discretion.
Reviewing motions to amend, Utah's appellate courts have suggested several factors
to consider including: "(1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the justification for delay; and
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(3) any resulting prejudice to the responding party." Atcitty v. Bd. ofEduc. of the San Juan
County Sck Dist, 967 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In this case, amendments to
the initial objection were filed in 1993 and 1999; however, no proceeding had taken place
since the initial objection was filed and the general adjudication was in the exact same
procedural posture when those amendments were filed. Additionally, there is no resulting
prejudice to the responding party. The State Engineer is not prejudiced by any of these
amendments because the State Engineer is not a water user competing for the same water
source and has no right or interest that would be affected by amending the Canal Company's
objection. Indeed, the State Engineer failed to act for twenty-seven years, indicating his
disinterest in the Canal Company's position. In addition, no other claimant in the general
adjudication will be affected.2 ] The State Engineer has admitted that no one else has obj ected
to the Canal Company's water user claim. (R. 454:150:3-4.) Because no one was harmed,
there was no reason for the district court not to allow the Canal Company's amendments.
Section 73-4-10 places no limitations on the timing, subject, or number of
amendments that can be permitted by the district court, though it clearly bestows on the
district court the discretion to allow amendments.

Amendments to objections, like

amendments to summonses and complaints, should be liberally granted to allow claimants'
objection to be heard on the merits. Because the statute allows for amendment, and because
analogous cases require courts to allow such amendments, the district court did not abuse its

2

indeed, neither of the other two water users who appeared in the proceeding below
bothered to object.
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discretion in allowing the Canal Company's subsequent objections to relate back to the initial
filing. Therefore, the district court's decision should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the decision of the district court. All the Canal Company
seeks is its day in court and the opportunity to prove the need to continue to receive the water
it is entitled to under its 1952 and 1969 claims. The State Engineer's recent change from
accepting objections regardless of when filed demonstrates a shift away from the goals of the
general adjudication and is in apparent contradiction of the State Engineer's role to correctly
apportion Utah's scarce and valuable water resources among competing users.
Although the State Engineer apparently may prosecute general adjudications at any
pace he desires, general adjudications cannot be endlessly delayed by him without certain
consequences. When the State Engineer chooses to wait twenty-seven years to seek
dismissal of an objection on a technical procedural ground, he must know that valuable
evidence that may excuse or explain the reason for the initial untimely filing will invariably
be lost (including crucial first-person testimony). The district court reached the appropriate
remedy, allowing the objection proceed on the merits. For the foregoing reasons, this Court
should affirm the district court's memorandum decision.
Dated this ^ ^ o a y ^ o f March, 2004,

SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC

/ortF
R. ChnStupKer Preston
Attorneys for Green River Canal Company
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UT ST § 73-4-3
UCA 1953 §73-4-3
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C
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION
CHAPTER 4. DETERMINATION OF WATER RIGHTS
73-4-3 Procedure for action to determine rights —Notice to
claimants —Manner of giving notice of further proceedings
engineer --Survey --Notice of completion.

and list of
--Duties of

Upon the filing of any action by the state engineer as provided in Section 734-1, or by any person or persons claiming the right to the use of the waters of
any river system, lake, underground water basin, or other natural source of
supply, which involves a determination of the rights to the major part of the
water of such source of supply or the rights of ten or more of the claimants of
such source of supply, the clerk of the district court shall notify the state
engineer that such suit has been filed. The state engineer then shall give notice
to the claimants by publishing notice once a week for two consecutive weeks in a
newspaper designated by the court as most likely to give notice to such claimants.
The notice shall set forth that: such an action has been filed; the name of the
action and the name and location of the court in which the action is pending; the
name or description of the water source involved; and shall require claimants to
the use of water therefrom to notify the state engineer within 90 days from the
date notice is given of their names and addresses. After the expiration of 90 days
the state engineer shall prepare a list which shall include the names and
addresses of all claimants then of record m his office and all claimants who have
notified the state engineer of their addresses, and this list shall be certified
by the state engineer as complete and filed with the clerk of the court. The court
upon petition may by order permit the addition of names and addresses to this list
at any time during the pendency of the action, and the clerk of the court may,
without court order, upon notice from the claimant note any change of address. If
any claimant appears in this action by an attorney, the clerk shall note on the
list the address of the attorney. After the list is filed by the state engineer,
notice of further proceedings, after service of summons, may be given without
court order by mailing a copy thereof to the persons listed at the addresses
listed and by mailing a copy thereof to any attorney of record for any such
person, and notice may be given to such listed persons and to all other claimants
by publication m the manner and for the time prescribed by order of the district
court. When such statement or list shall have been filed, the state engineer shall
begin the survey of the water source and the ditches, canals, wells, tunnels, or
other works diverting water therefrom; and as soon as this survey has been
completed, the state engineer shall file notice of completion with the clerk and
give notice by registered mail or by personal service to all claimants whose names
appear on the list that the survey has been completed and that their claims are
due within 90 days from the date of notice, and within 90 days after such service
of such notice each claimant must file a written statement with the clerk of the
court setting forth his respective claim to the use of such water. Notice given by
mail shall be complete when the notice is mailed. When such a suit has been filed
by the state engineer as provided by Section 73-4-1, or by any person or persons
involving the major part of the waters of any river system, lake, underground
water basin, or other source of supply, or the rights of ten or more of the water
claimants of such source of supply, whether such suit is filed prior to or after
the enactment hereof, it shall be the duty of the state engineer upon receiving
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notice thereof to examine the records of his office with respect to the water
source involved, and if they are incomplete to make such further investigation and
survey as may be necessary for the preparation of the report and recommendation as
required by Section 73-4-11. In all such cases the court shall proceed to
determine the water rights involved m the manner provided by this chapter, and
not otherwise.

History: L. 1919, ch. 67, § 22; R.S. 1933, 100-4-3; L. 1935, ch. 105, § 1; 1939,
ch. 112, § 1; C. 1943, 100-4-3; L. 1943, ch. 107, § 1; 1948 (1st S.S.), ch. 14, §
1; 1979, ch. 252, § 1.

NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS

NOTES TO DECISIONS

ANALYSIS
Adjudication of rights.
Jurisdiction and venue.
Private suits.
Procedure.
Written statement.

Adjudication of rights.
The statute cleacly contemplates that the individual rights of each claimant shall
be adjusted and adjudicated. Huntsville Irrigation Ass'n v. District Court, 72
Utah 431, 270 P. 1090 (1928) .
In action to quiet title to water rights in Virgin River water system, court did
not err m
also determining rights to Summit Spring, where all parties sought
determination of spring rights, no useful purpose would be served m
compelling
retrial thereof, and variance with respect to whether spring was part of river
water system was not objected to. St. George & Wash. Canal Co. v. Hurricane Canal
Co., 93 Utah 262, 72 P.2d 642 (1937).
In a general det ermmation suit the rights to the use of water may be determined
not only as between and among the claimants and users on one side and the state of
Utah on the other, but also as between and among all the claimants and users
thereof. In re Green River Drainage Area, 147 F. Supp. 127 (D. Utah 1956);
Huntsville Irrigation Ass'n v. District Court, 72 Utah 431, 270 P. 1090 (1928).
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UT ST §73-4-10
U C A . 1953 §73-4-10
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION
CHAPTER 4. DETERMINATION OF WATER RIGHTS
73-4-10 Amendment of pleadings --Extensions of time.

The court shall have power to allow amendments to any petition, statement or
pleading; to extend as provided m this title the time for filing any statement of
claim; and to extend, upon due cause shown, the time for filing any other
pleading, statement, report or protest.

History: L. 1919, ch. 67, § 31; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 100-4-10.

NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Amendment of pleadings.
Complaint, in action by alleged prior appropriator to quiet his title to all the
waters of a stream, may be amended to conform to the evidence. Lawson v. McBride,
71 Utah 239, 264 P. 727 (1928).

U.C.A. 1953 § 73-4-10, UT ST § 73-4-10

Statutes current through 2003 2nd Special Session. Annotations current through
UT 51 (11/14/2003), 2003 Utah APP 389 (11/14/2003 and November 14, 2003
(Federal Cases).

Copyright © 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the

of the LexisNexis Group.

All rights reserved.

END OF DOCUMENT
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UT ST §73-4-11
U C A 1953 §73-4-11
C
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION
CHAPTER 4. DETERMINATION OF WATER RIGHTS
73-4-11 Report and recommendation by engineer to court.

Within thirty days after the expiration of the 60 days allowed for filing
statements of claims, the state engineer shall begin to tabulate the facts
contained m
the statements filed and to investigate, whenever he shall deem
necessary, the facts set forth m
said statements by reference to the surveys
already made or by further surveys, and shall as expeditiously as possible make a
report to the court with his recommendation of how all rights involved shall be
determined.

After full consideration of the statements of claims, and of the surveys, records,
and files, and after a personal examination of the river system or water source
involved, if such examination is deemed necessary, the state engineer shall
formulate a report and a proposed determination of all rights to the use of the
water of such river system or water source, and a copy of the same shall be mailed
by regular mail to each claimant with notice that any claimant dissatisfied
therewith may within ninety days from such date of mailing file with the clerk of
the district court a written objection thereto duly verified on oath. The state
engineer shall distribute the waters from the natural streams or other natural
sources m
accordance with the proposed determination or modification thereof by
court order until a final decree is rendered by the court; provided, if the right
to the use of said waters has been theretofore decreed or adjudicated said waters
shall be distributed in accordance with such decree until the same is reversed,
modified, vacated or otherwise legally set aside.

History: L. 1919, ch. 67, § 32; R.S. 1933, 100-4-11; L. 1937, ch. 130, §
1943, 100-4-11.

1; C.

NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS

Compiler's Notes. --Section 73-4-5 allows ninety days for filing statements
claims, not sixty days as set out m the first paragraph of this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

ANALYSIS
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Claim No_
F.Ied

J9^3L2-

Rec By_

X° rt?

MllS

Rec $2 50 fee_

STATEMENT OF WATER USERS CLAIM
TO DILIGENCE RIGHTS
STATE OF UTAH

Claim to surface water by right of use prior to March 12 1903 is hereby made and filed with the State Engineer, together
with a filing fee of $250 and submitted in accordance with Sections 100 2 14 and 100 5-15 Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as
amended by the Session Laws of 1949
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DRlhftr-h T-irlvrftll
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STATE WHETHER

0.K« Anderson
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(Sflfsrfttary)

(IP A COMPANY GIVE NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT A # D SECRETARY)
I
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\s
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particular

spring,

spring

area,

r.-rnan P-tv^r
Irrigation
Mining
Domestic
Mumcipal
Stockwatermg
Power

4 Nature, A m o u nt
and Annual Period of
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Sec
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Sec
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Sec

stream

or tributary
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Emery

Ft 6JQ
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(STRIKE OUT ONES NOT NEEDED)
(IF FOR USE OTHER THAN HERE LISTED SET FORTH IN BLANK SPACE)

5 Direct Flow Appropriation
(ajjgoint of diversion from spring spring area stream or tributary (This and point of rediversion must be described with
reference to U S Government survey corner) (Strike words not needed )
Lorth 60^0*

E a s t 4540 f t .

from t h e Southwest Corner of S e c t i o n 1 7 ,

TrrwnKhip 2 0 , S o u t h , Range 16 E a s t S a l t Lake Base M e r i d i a n

(b) Point of rediversion_

6 Appropriation for Storage Purposes
(a) Name of reservoir if known by name.
(b) 'Maximum capacity of reservoir m acre feet
(c) lear construction commenced
(d) Location of reservoir

(Submit area-capacity table).
_, water first used_

, completed

(State legal subdivisions inundated in whole or part )_

(e) h reservoir located on or off stream from which water is claimed for storage purposes?.
(f) Period of Storage
(g) At foil stage

Area in acres inundated

Annual Period of Use.

(GIVE BKQINNXNO AND ENDING DATES)

Max depth in feet_

(h) If a yearly record of amount of water stored in past is available, give same, on sheet attached
(i) *Is reservoir drained each year?
•See rules and regulations

No of fillings per year
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(j) Give following information as to feeder canal in case reservoir JS off source of supply,
(1) Maximum carrying capacity of feeder caral in seond feet
(2) Point of diversion of supply canal from stream or inbutarv
(Must be described with reference to U. S Government
survey corner)

7. D i v e r t i n g W o r k s
(a) Diverting dam nature type and dimensions n f P f t i n . f o r o f t d
(b) flowing or pump well D.am
X
Dopth
Strike out word not needed)
(L) Heddgate nature and ivpc of
X
(d) Water measuring device nature and type of
(e) Canal

length 7 4 . 0 0 0

ft»

Depth of \ v a t e r _ _ _ _ )

.Grade per 1000 fee.t

second feet

(f) Flume
(g) Pumps

Concrete

W.drh at top 3 0

.

Honcrntft?
Y

Number

Length

85

ft*

Width at Hottnm

0*358

Width 5 0

Lfmgth 810
Width 51

14= f t .

Maximum c a m mg capaut\ in

in.

Pnnlr>

and

Depth nl Water

.Type

Rfifttry

3*00

Sandy

r.r^.^t

Capacity

Make_

T.nnm
2tT/l00T

Head

How operated

(h) Date when work on diverting system was first begun

f t * Ht»
f t T

Tfeir

ft,

Material through which canal parses S h q 1 c

Material S t e e l

Gravity,

_________

Feb*

23

t

IB92

(i) Nature of such work Timber-Rook F i l l e d Cribb Dam—Brush and Rocks
(j) Date when diverting system was completed
(k) Date when water was first used

April

18QQ
1RR*|

Quantity used .

Area irrigated 1903 by surface waterJL_Q0

In 1935 by underground water

(1) If canal or well has been enlarged, give date of enlargements and additional capacity A p r i l

1910

——25

n.f.a.

8 Where Water Is Used for Irrigation Purposes
(a) Area and legal subdivisions of land embracing area irrigated the first year (give dates)
(b) Area and legal subdivisions of land embracing area irrigated each year thereafter (give dates)
S ^

AhhanVmri

Sh^ftt

(c) Date of last enlargement of irrigated area. 1903
(d) Give area in each legal subdivision of land (40-acre tracts) irrigated at present time, if only parts of legal subdivisions
are irrigated give acreage in each 40-acre legal subdivision (attach sheet if necessary)

See attached Sheet

(e) Character of soil irngdted?RTidy TiflBIP. depth,

8. X t «

Character of subsoil

Grave,!

Grain—300 A c . f Cantalopes—
Orchard—20 A c , L e l o n s — 4 0 4o» P 55 Acres r i s a e l l a n e o u s

(f) Kind of crops raised la<t year and acreage of p«ph H a y — 6 0 0 Ac * t

300 A c . r Corn 160 _ • .

Truok Products,
(g) Maximum acreage of

fr^p
anous crops irrigated at any time during period of use

(h) Minimum acreage of various crops irrigated at any time during period of use
(i) Do you use water for irrigation outside the growing season 7 ,

JL&&5
1275

i—
.

UQ

(1) If so, to what extent and purpose 9
(2) If for irrigation, what crops?
(j) Is an> portion of the land listed as irrigated water-logged>

H.Q..

If so, how much in each legal subdivision?

(k) Is any portion of the land listed as irrigated drained by artificial means'

(1) Do you get water under a partnership ditch 7 Tin
land each irrigates at present

...

Ho ,

If so, give names and addresses of partners and amount of
•

—.—__

9. Where Water Is Used for Power Purposes
(a) Water wheels used

No

Type

(b) Head under which each wheel operates.

Actual Capacity of each
.Rated H P of each

—_

13

f

(c) Purpose for which power is used_
(d) Place or places where power is used
(e) Point where water is returned to the natural stream (Must be described with reference to U
-cortter)

10

S Government survey

W h e r e W a t e r Is U s e d for M i n i n g P u r p o s e s
ta)~Na«qe o? mining distnct___

Name of Mine .

(b) Kjnd of ore or ores mined
(cX Purpose of Use
(d) Point where unused water, if any, is returned to the natural stream

(Must be described with reference to U. S

Government survey corner )

_________

11. W h e r e W a t e r Is U s e d for Stock W a t e r i n g *
(a) Type of conserving works
(1) Troughs, number and size
Watered

in

irrigation

l a t a m !

ditnrms

running

through

fields
(2) Ponds, number, size and depth

(3) Sumps, number, size and depth_
(b) Number of each kind of range stock wat-Mrl

2

000

Cattle—5000

Sheet)—100

Horses

12 Where Water Is Used for Domestic and Municipal Purposes:
(a) If for domestic use
(1) Place or places by legal subdiv of 40 ac where used

(2) Number of persons and families supplied _____
(3) Number of each kind of domestic stock watered (not included in par. 11) .

(4) Total acreage of gardens and lawns irrigated (not included m par 8 ) _

8Q /.eras

(b) If for municipal use
(1) Name of city or town supplied

"RlVftr

Citff-

(3) Approximate quantity of water in gallons per day used

_L_kj-L

(2) Population

(Trflfln

1200

13. W h e r e W a t e r is U s e d for a Purpose N o t a b o v e E n u m e r a t e d .

(Describe

in

d e t a i l , in

space

below

the

n a t u r e and extent of s u c h u s e . )

14. W a t e r m e a s u r e m e n t w a s m a d e by
^l)>i_________J_______a

Current

Meter

on

_

d a y of

AttgUgfr

m e t h o d and reported in detail o n attached s t a t e m e n t .

SIGNATURE OF CliAUtCANT

STATE OF UTAH
(To be used if claimant is an individual)
COUNTY O F

Em«ry

, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says that he is
the claimant whose name appears hereon, that he has read the foregoing statement of his claim and knows the cont^its thereof,
that he has signed the same, and that the answers set forth therein are true to his best knowledge and belief.
SIGNATURE OCP CLAIMANT

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of

My commission expires

NOTARY PUBLIC

STATE OF UTAH

J

COUNTY OF £/??&**¥

I

/JP//>+/*

T

, 19

/ / /?{

-> Jj> //

^

(To be used if claimant is a corporation,
co-iwrrtrrcrskip or asyxMatinn)
, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says that he is the

__of the organization above named, that he makes this certification
on behalf of said organization, that he has read the foregoing statement of claim and knows the contents thereof, and that he has
sigc-d the name of said organization to said statement, that the answers set forth therein are true to his best knowledge and

W1

"-

£r^AP^J~<Uu+trfJ0P

Xl_

TabE

U.C.A. 1953 § 7 3 - 5 - 1 3
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION
CHAPTER 5. ADMINISTRATION AND DISTRIBUTION
Copyright © 1953, 1971, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1985 by The Allen Smith
Company. Copyright © 1987-1996 by Michie, a division of Reed
Elsevier Inc and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved.
7 3 - 5 - 1 3 Notice of claim to surface or underground water not otherwise represented — Filing —
Form -- Information and proof required — Corrections — Prima facie evidence of rights.
All claimants to the right to the use of water, including both surface and underground, whose rights
are not represented by certificates of appropriation issued by the state engineer, by applications
filed with the state engineer, by court decrees or by notice of claim heretofore filed pursuant to law,
shall file notice of such claim or claims with the state engineer on forms furnished by him setting
forth such information and accompanied by such proof as the state engineer may require, including
but not limited to the following:
The name and post-office address of the person making the claim; the quantity of water claimed in
acre-feet; and/or the rate of flow in second feet; the source of supply; the priority of the right, the
location of the point of diversion with reference to a United States land survey corner, the place,
nature, and extent of use, the time during which the water has been used each year and the date
when the water was first used. A notice of claim may be corrected by filing with the state engineer a
corrected notice designated as such and bearing the same number as the original claim. No fees
shall be charged for filing a corrected notice of claim.
Such notices of claim, or claims, as provided in this section, shall be prima facie evidence of claimed
right or rights therein described.
History: C. 1943, 100-5-15, added by L 1949, ch. 97, § 3; 1955, ch. 160, § 1.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Energy Law and Policy. — A Primer of Utah Water Law, 5 J. Energy L. & Pol'y 165 (1984).
U.C.A. 1953 § 7 3 - 5 - 1 3
UT ST § 7 3 - 5 - 1 3
END OF DOCUMENT
Copr (C) West 2004 No Claim to Ong U S Govt

Works

TabF

J. Craig Smith (4143)
David B. Hartvigaea (5390)
Brian C Cheney (8881)
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East Soulh Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Attorneys for Green River Canal Company
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION
OF RLOHTS TO THE USE OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE
AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA
OF THE GREEN RIVER FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF
THE PRICE AND GREEN RIVERSTOTHE CONFLUENCE
OF THE GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS EXCLUDINO
THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER IN
UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF EMERY

)

AFFIDAVIT OF JACK A HARNETT
Code Nog. 91 and 92
Civil No. 8598

JACK BARNETT, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am the President of Barnett Intermountain Water Consulting, a water rights and

water resources firm, which Ifoundedin 1981. For a period in my career I was employed as an area
engineer in the Office of the State Engineer for Utah. I am also a Professional Engineer, and a
Professional Geologist, duly licensed in the state of Idaho.
2.

I have beenretainedby the Green River Canal Company as a consultant and expert

witness in another action bzought by the Canal Company. In connection with those services, I have
inspected the Canal Company's diversion works and canal system on several different occasions in
I13373.GK255.0QS

EQ'd TdlDl

the last few years. I have observed its operation and discussed the same with many of iU officers,
directors, and shareholders*
3,

On May 5f 1999, I had the flows in the Canal Company's raceway and canal

measured. Theflowsin the raceway were measured at 853 cfe and the flows in the canal were
measured at 79.4 cfe. The remainingflowsinfeeraceway, which amounted to 773.6 cfe, were being
divertedtoMr. Lee Thayn4,

It is my opinion that it is currently necessary, and has been necessary for as long as

fee canal system has been in its present configuration,forthe canal to have approximately 80 cubic
feet per second of water flowing in it during the irrigation season in orderforthe canal system to
filiation properly.
5,

The Green River is extremely silt laden and the silt settles out rapidly as the water

moving through the raceway and canal slows down. Therefore,frequentsluicing is essential to the
operation of the canal.
DATED this JL day of December, 2000.

Jack A. Bamett, Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this /-^day of December, 2000,

mmm

naroXOlSSDOS

A

'

N P ^ - V ^

Notary Public

I

DQNA.BARNETT

,

10S West 500 Soutn, S utte 101
Boumrlul, Utah 64010
My Commission Expires
January 30.2002

I
.
|

Stale of Utah

J
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N THE

SEVENTH

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR THE
CARB0N

COUNTY OF

STATE OF UTAH

< THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION
F RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE AND
IDERGROUNO, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE PRICE
VER AND OF THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE GREEN RIVER
OM THE CONFLUENCE OF THE PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS
TH* CONFLUENCE OF THE GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS
CLUDING THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER
UTAH

\ STATEMENT Or WATER
) USERS CLAIM
( CODE NO SERIAL NO
(
91
294
1
/ M A PN O
144d

>TE This blank is sent to you tn accordance with Utah Law The information called for herein will be uaed to con
nun with the adjudication of water nghts on the above mentioned drainage area. All questions applicable to your claim
»t be answered fully and one copy of this form must be f 'ed with the Clerk of the District Court it
"r*ce
Utah, within sixty (60) days from date of service of the attached Notice A copy shall be
d with rhe State Engineer State Capitol Salt Lake City Failure to file the attached Statement of the Water Users
im widK die Clerk of the District Court widun the tune stated will forever bar and eatop you from asserting any right
he use of water from said drainage area
G
Name of Claimant
* * « n R i v « r C a n * 1 Company
F u

Interest Claimed
Addre„

**

Green R i v e r , Utah $4525

Name of particular spring spring area, stream well tunnel or drain from which water is diverted is

Green River ( G r a v i t y Canal)
Priority date claimed

loot)

&mery

tn

^^

wnen

firf,

water w s u

Date when work on diverting system was first *»egun

County

uje<j

Date when diverting system was completed

Nature of work
Class of Right (Indicate by X )
(a) X Right to surface water initiated by beneficial use before 1903 Claim No
^
b)
Right to underground water initiated before 1935 Claim No
c)
Right decreed by court, cite title of case
d)
Application filed, State Engineer s Office No
Cert of App No
e)
Right acquired by adverse use prior to 1939
Mature (Indicate by X ) Amount and Annual Period of Use (by month & day)
60 c

a)X

lrngJUI0n

sec Ft

b)X

Stockwatenng

Sec Ft

Domestic

Sec Ft I n c .

)

x

* » from

2 0

Mfirch

i5

to

from

January

1

from

January 1

November 1

(boch

^

( both

ind

>

t0

December 31

dates mcl )

w

December 3 1 < both dates m d )

I)
Municipal
Sec Ft
from
to
(both dates incl )
)
Sec Ft.
from,
to
(both dates incl)
rect Flow Appropriation (must be described with reference to U S Government Survey Corner)
N
) Pome of divenion from spring spcing area, stream, well tunnel drain
* 1 9 5 0 f t . a n d W. 8 0 0

ft. fron the SE Cor., Sec. 17, T20S, R16E, SLB6&.
) Description of spring area
) Point of rediversion or point of return to natural channel
I If flow is intermittently diverted list by number or description, all rights involved
terc water is used for irrigation purposes
Area irrigated in legal subdivisions of land by 40-acre tract (Ail sources of water for same land or lands must

.

L .

.

.

,

. ,

CLAIMS USED FOR PURPOSE DESCiUBLD.

described in each instance bv name uc claim number)

Do you get water under a ditch owned by severaJ users

If so, give names of all users and

ons of interest
e water is used for Stockwatenng

„

w. , uc. A i

L

_ _

A

.

„. ~ , « ~ .

dumber of each kind of stock watered
•
*
'
Ml sources of water for same stock (Describe by name or claim number)

e water is used for Domestic
iumber of families or their equivalent
ribe by name ur claim number)

, ^r, »,

2,000 Cattle, 3,000 Sheep, 100 Horses
r

„
All sources of water for same use

VChere water is uted for Municipal Purposes
(*) Name of city or town supplied

Populiuoo

Number of families
12 Where water is used for a purpose not above enumerated

Quantity of mater

( a ) Nature of Use

13

U

Extent of Lse

Appropriation for Storage Purposes
(a) Name of reservoir
(b) Location of reservoir by legal subdixisions described by 40 at re traits
(c) Maximum capacity of re-iervoir in aire feet
Year const-urtion commenced
Completed
Water first used
Is reservoir Wnjied on or off stream
(d) Period of Storage from
to
(both date* i wl ) Period of use from
to
(both dates incl ) Maximum area in acres inund4ttJ
Max depth in feet
Average depth in feet
Is reservoir drained each year
Maximum number of fillings per
year
Is reservou used for equalizing purposes
U feeder canal u used, give maximum
carrying capacity in tec ft
Diverting Works

(a) Surface water diverting dam Material composed of
Max length
Max height
Max. widdi at bottom
Max width
at top
(b) Underground water diverting works Is well flowing or pump
Depth of well
Diameter of well
Length of drain
Width of dram
Depth of dram
Diameter of drain
Length of runnel
Width of tunnel
Height of tunnel
Type of pump
Capacity of pump
(c) Surface and underground water conveying works Length of ditch to first place of use
Width of
ditch at top
Width of ditch at bottom
Depth of water
Grade of
ditch per 1000 it
Material through which ditch paaaes
Maximum lengdi of
pipe line to first place of u«
Diameter of pipe line
Grade of pipe line per
1000 feet
15 The undersigned hereby enters his appearance and waives service of summons or other process
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF

\
(SS
)

(To be used if claimant is an individual)

being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says that he is die claimant
whose name appears hereon, that he haj read the foregoing statement of his claim and knows die contents thereof, that
he has signed the same, and that the answers set forth uWein are true to his best knowledge and belief

Signature of Claimant
Subscribed and sworn to before me dus

day of

19

NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF UTAH

\
(SS (To be used if claimant is a corporation or an estate)
COUNTY OF
Emery
)
Joftft V e t ^ T S * J r .
being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says uSat he is the
President
of the above claimant, daat he makes this certification on behalf of said
claimant, that he has read the foregoing statement of claim and knows the contents thereof and that he hat signed the name
of said claimant to utd statement that the answers set forth therein are true to bts best knowledge and belief

Green River Canal Company
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

6th

day 0(

November

tye&zrrf

19

President

69

91-294

9.20 a c s . in SEiNEi, 1.7 a c s . in NEiSE-^, Sec. 20; 7.70 a c s . in N£4hE4, 9.00 a c s .
in SEiNEi, 6.60 a c s . in SW*SE%, 0.20 a c . in N£*SE%, 24.30 a c s . in NVtSE-4, 0.70
ac. in NEiSWi, 22.40 a c s . in SW*SE*, 23.30 a c s . in b£%SVi, Sec. 29;

23.00 a c s .

IK SEiNEi, 28.40 a c s . in KEiSLX, 1.10 a c s . i n S£iS£*, Sec- 3 1 ; 4.7 a c s . in NWtNEi,,
36.00 a c s . i n NE&Wi, 9.30 a c s . in NW-tNVk, 17.70 a c s . i n SEiNtf*, 35.70 a c s . in
SW^NVi, 7.20 a c s . in NVISW%, S e c . 32;

a l l in T20S, R16E, SLB6W.

15.20 a c s .

Lot 1 , 32.50 a c s . Lot 2, 45.50 a c s . i n Lot 3 , 8.50 a c s . Lot 4 , 4.60 a c s . Lot 9 ,
28.70 a c s . Lot 10, 11.8 a c s . Lot 11, Sec. 3; 4.20 a c s . Lot 16, 20.00 a c s . Lot 20,
0.70 a c . NWiSE*, 36.00 a c s . i n SE*S£4>, 31.80 a c s . i n SWifcE-a,, 4llC a c s . i n SE*bW*,
Sec. 4; 36.00 a c s . In NE-fcNE-t, 33.80 a c s . in HWiNEi, 16.00 a c s . in NciNW*, 37.70
a c s . in SEiNEi, 37.50 a c s . i n SWiNEi, 1.10 a c s . in SEiNWi, 9.70 a c s . in NEfcSE*,
33.50 a c s . in NV*S&fc, 1.70 a c s . in NEiSV*, 2.80 a c s . i n SEtSE-i,, 27.80 a c s . i n
SViSE*. 9.20 a c s . i s SEiSW-k, Sec. 9; 20.00 a c s . in NViNE*, 31.60 a c s . in NEiNW*,
39.00 a c s . in NWiNWi, 33.2C a c s . in SW^tA, 38.OO a c s . in St-att^, 3o.20 a c s . in
SWiNVi, 22.70 a c s . i s NW^SEi, 40.00 a c s . in NEiSWi, 38.70 a c s . in NVUSV*, 5.40
a c s . i n SW&E3>, 34.30 a c s . in SE&W-t, 25.70 a c s . in SW*SV*, bee. 10; 20.70 a c s .
in NEiNWi, 37.60 a c s . in NW*NW*, 0.4C a c . in SE*NWi, 5.70 a c s . in SW*NV*, 8.50
a c s . in NWiSWi, 5.20 a c s . in SU&Wi, bee. 15; 13.90 a c s . in NE*HE*, 29.50 a c s .
in NViNEi, 4.40 a c s . in NEiNWi, 29.40 a c s . in SE*NE*, 16.20 a c s . in SW*NE*,
22.50 a c s . in NEiSE^, 28.50 a c s . in NV>SE^, 2.00 a c s . in Nh^SW^, 35.50 a c s .
in SEiSEi, 26.20 a c s . in SViSE*,, 0.20 a c s . in SEtSW*t Sec. l b ; 23.00 a c s .
in KEUE^., Sec. 21, 3.50 a c s . in NW^NWi, 1.40 a c s . i n SW-**W„, b e e 22, a l l
in T21S, R16E, SLB6&.

Total of 1,443.J0 a c r e s .
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DEC 0 5 2003
SMITH HARTVIGSEN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY

FIRST ADDENDUM TO THE PROPOSED DETERMINATION OF WATER RIGHTS
PRICE RIVER AND LOWER GREEN RIVER DRAINAGE

IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION
OF THE RIGHTS TO USE OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE
AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE
THE PRICE RIVER AND OF THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE GREEN RIVER FROM THE
CONFLUENCE OF THE PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS TO THE CONFLUENCE OF THE
GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS EXCLUDING THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE
SAN RAFAEL RIVER IN UTAH

AREA 91
ALL BOOKS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
afe 3fe afe afe 3(e

IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION OF THE RIGHTS TO USE OF
WATER, BOTH SURFACE AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA OF
THE PRICE RIVER AND OF THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE GREEN RIVER FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF
THE PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS TO THE CONFLUENCE OF THE GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS EXCLUDING
THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER IN UTAH
PRICE RIVER DRAINAGE (AREA 91-ALL)
Civil No 690708598 (91-All)
*****

NOTICE TO WATER USERS WITHIN THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED DRAINAGE AREA
This is your copy of the First Addendum to the Proposed Determination of Water Rights in Area 91, All Books, of the Price River
Drainage The Proposed Determination, as modified by this First Addendum, is the State Engineer's report and recommendation to the Court. A copy of
the Proposed Determination (as contained in several published books) and this Addendum will be on file with the Clerk of the Seventh District Court in
Price, Utah Additional copies may be obtained from the Division of Water Rights at 1594 West North Temple, Suite 220, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, by
paying the cost of printing
You are hereby notified that under Section 73-4-11, Utah Code Annotated (1989), any claimant dissatisfied with the First Addendum to
the Proposed Determination may object, but only as follows- The claimant must file with the Clerk of the Seventh District Court in Price, a written
objection duly verified on oath. The objection must be filed within ninety (90) days after the claimant is served with the First Addendum to the Proposed
Determination, and must reference Civil No 690708598 (91-All) The date of service is either the date the First Addendum was mailed to the claimant's
address of record at the Office of the State Engineer, or the date the claimant picked up a copy of the First Addendum in person (in lieu of mailing) If a
claimant receives copies by mail and in person, the earlier date of service begins the ninety day objection period A copy of the objection should also be
sent to the Division of Water Rights at the mailing address shown below The objection may address only the irrigation duty as described in this First
Addendum Objections may not address issues that could have been raised as to the unmodified Proposed Determination
L Ward Wagstaff
Julie I Valdes
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for the State Engineer

Jerry D Olds, P E
State Engineer
DIVISION OF WATER RIGH TS
Price River Adjudication
P O Box 146300
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6300

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION
OF THE RIGHTS TO USE OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE
AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA
OF THE PRICE RIVER AND OF THE DRAINAGE AREA OF
THE GREEN RIVER FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF THE
PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS TO THE CONFLUENCE OF
THE GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS EXCLUDING THE
DRAINAGE AREA OF THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER IN UTAH

Jerry D. Olds, State Engineer of the State of Utah,
respectfully submits this report to the Court.
1. Geographical Area Covered This General Adjudication
includes all water sources, both surface and underground,
within the Drainage Area of the Price River and the drainage
area of the Green River from the confluence of the Price and
Green Rivers to the confluence of the Green and Colorado
Rivers excluding the drainage area of the San Rafael River in
Utah. This Proposed Determination covers only those water
rights in the Price River Drainage (Area 91) of the General
Adjudication. Area 91 is shown on the index map immediately

hereinafter.

PROPOSED DETERMINATION OF WATER RIGHTS
IN THE PRICE RIVER AND LOWER GREEN RIVER
DRAINAGE
AREA 91, ALL BOOKS
Civil No. 690708598 (91-ALL)

2.
Duty of Irrigation Water. In response to certain
objections to the Proposed Determinations regarding duty, the
State Engineer has re-evaluated the duty in Area 91. The maps
published herein present the boundaries and newly determined
duties for Area 91. More detailed maps are available for
review in the Price and Salt Lake City offices of the State
Engineer. The calculation of duty contemplates many factors,
including evapotranspiration, average precipitation, and
application and conveyance losses.
Because a water right is limited by the extent of its
beneficial use, an irrigation right is limited by the acreage
actually irrigated. The amount of water which may be diverted
to irrigate the crops to maturity in a specific area is known as

the duty. The duty per calendar year is measured at the point of
diversion from the natural water source. The duty shown is
based on efficiencies associated with flood irrigation practices.
As irrigation practices change to improve irrigation efficiency,
it is anticipated less water will be diverted.
The State Engineer has determined that in the Price
River drainage area, the application each year of more than the
individually or generally established duty of water per acre is
unnecessary and would not be a beneficial use of the excess
water.

3. This Proposed Determination of Water Rights was
approved for publication on the _ ^ £
day of
/ie^u
'
, 2003.

JERRY D^OLDS, P.E.
tate Engineer

Location Map
Water Right Area 91
Duty
'Scofield

_T
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J. Craig Smith (4143)
David B. Hartvigsen (5390)
Brian C.Cheney (8881)
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Attorneys for Green River Canal Company

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION
OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE
AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA
OF THE GREEN RIVER FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF
THE PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS TO THE CONFLUENCE
OF THE GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS EXCLUDING
THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER IN
UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

AFFIDAVIT OF HAROLD D.
DONALDSON
CodeNos. 91 and 92
Civil No. 8598

HAROLD D. DONALDSON, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

1.

I was employed by the State of Utah in the Utah State Water Engineer's office, also

known as the Division of Water Rights, from approximately 1952 to 1988. During the period of
time from 1956 to 1988,1 was in charge of overseeing various general adjudication proceedings
including the above-captioned general adjudication and was designated as the Directing Engineer
over Adjudications in that office.
113282.GR255.O05

2.

I was personally involved in preparing the proposed determinations of water rights

in the various general adjudication proceedings.
3.

I was also personally involved in distributing the proposed determination books to

the various water claimants.
4.

After the proposed determination was distributed to the water claimants, I was also

personally involved in investigating and responding to any objections to the proposed determination
by the water claimants.
5.

It was the policy of the State Engineer's office to investigate and answer each protest

to the proposed determination and submit the answer thereto to the Attorney General's office,
regardless of when it was filed. In numerous cases, the Attorney General's office did not act
pursuant to our answer or recommendation but rather were unable to proceed due to lack of
manpower.
6.

During my involvement in this and other General Adjudications, because the Attorney

General's office was unable to prosecute the General Adjudications due to its heavy involvement
in other litigation, objections filed after the expiration of the ninety day periods were accepted. If
the State Engineer's office did not agree with the Objection, then the Objection was litigated on its
merits even if untimely. The State Engineer's office sought to determine the water rights on their
merits in order to make the final determination as accurate and correct as possible.
7.

I have reviewed the objections of the Green River Canal Company in the above

captioned general adjudication and, in my opinion, the objections have merit due to the unique
circumstances of the high silt load in the Canal and the Green River and thus additional water is used
for the system to properly function in the way it has been historically, and the Objection should be

113282.GR255.005

2

incorporated into the proposed determination by way of addendum, or should their merits be
opposed, be heard by and decided by this Court on its merits.

DATED this /

day of December, 2000.

Hardld D. Donaldson, Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on t h i s / ^ day of December, 2000

otar^ Public

113282 GR255 005

3

\^

